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INTRODUCTION
On April 16, 2007, Seung Hui Cho ("Cho"), a senior at Virginia
Tech, shot and killed thirty-two fellow students and faculty members
and injured seventeen more before killing himself on the Blacksburg,
Virginia campus.1 At approximately 7:15 that morning, Cho entered
West Ambler Johnston dormitory on campus and shot two students.2
He then returned to his dorm room, changed his bloody clothes,
logged onto his computer, and walked to the post office to mail a
package of writings and video recordings to NBC News.3 About two
* Copyright © 2008 by Mary Fletcher Pefia.
1. See VIRGINIA TECH REVIEW PANEL, REPORT OF THE REVIEW PANEL: MASS
SHOOTINGS AT VIRGINIA TECH 25 (2007), http://www.governor.virginia.gov/
TempContent/techPanelReport-docs/FullReport.pdf [hereinafter VIRGINIA TECH
REPORT]. The school's official name is Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University; it will be referred to as "Virginia Tech" throughout this Comment.
2. See id. at 1.
3. See id. at 25-26; see also Michael E. Ruane & Chris L. Jenkins, Gunman Sent
Video During Lull in Slaughter: Menacing Poses and Bitter Words in Mailing to NBC,
WASH. POST, Apr. 19, 2007, at Al (noting that Cho took time, after killing two students,
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hours after the initial shooting, Cho walked to Norris Hall carrying a
backpack full of chains, locks, a hammer, a knife, two guns, and
almost 400 rounds of ammunition.4 After chaining the three main
entrances to Norris Hall from the inside, Cho proceeded to classroom
after classroom, opening fire on the students and teachers.' The
shooting continued for over ten minutes before police finally gained
entrance to Norris Hall.6 Just as police reached the second floor, Cho
shot himself in the head.7
Along with the grief and outrage have come questions as to what,
if anything, could have been done to prevent Cho from taking so
many lives. Some have leveled charges of negligence against Virginia
Tech, claiming that the university ignored obvious warning signs8 and
should be held liable for failing to protect the campus from a deeply
disturbed and violent student. These individuals point to events that,
in hindsight, appear to be red flags, such as Cho's documented mental
illness and alarming behavior,9 but such criticisms tend to ignore a
more complex reality.1" For instance, how does a university provide
help to a student, like Cho, who does not request or accept it?11
In the aftermath of this brutal campus shooting, the deadliest in
U.S. history,12 the short answer to whether Virginia Tech could have
prevented the tragedy is that, under the current state of
confidentiality and disability laws, perhaps nothing else could have
been done. 3 And perhaps no one, besides Cho himself, is to blame.
to mail a multi-media package of materials designed to explain his actions to NBC News in
New York City).
4. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 89.
5. See id. at 26.
6. See id. at 27.
7. See id. at 27-28.
8. The Virginia Tech Report states that "[d]uring Cho's junior year at Virginia Tech,
numerous incidents occurred that were clear warnings of mental instability.... No one
knew all the information and no one connected all the dots." Id. at 2. For example, some
students in Cho's poetry class were so afraid and spooked by him that they refused to
show up for class, and the English professor feared for Cho's safety and her own. See id.
at 42-43.
9. See infra notes 244-57 and accompanying text.
10. See infra Part III.B.
11. See infra note 271 and accompanying text.
12. See Ian Shapira & Tom Jackman, Gunman Kills 32 at Virginia Tech in Deadliest
Shooting in U.S. History, WASH. POST, Apr. 17, 2007, at Al. There have been several
deadlier shootings in U.S. history but not by a single gunman and not on a school campus.
Id.
13. Life experience tells us that no combination of laws and regulations designed to
protect college students from harm can guarantee that a similar tragedy will not happen
again. See John Silber, To Shield All Tragedy an Impossible Quest, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr.
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Notwithstanding, this Comment argues that a series of legal and
policy proposals could reduce the likelihood of a reoccurrence of such
events. These proposals attempt to realign the risks and
responsibilities that institutions of higher education ("IHE") face vis-
a-vis their students. As it stands, the current legal landscape
frequently places IHEs in a "damned if you do, damned if you don't"
position when responding to students with mental health problems.
The campus mental health crisis is a complex societal problem
that universities have been actively struggling with for over a decade.
The Virginia Tech massacre has brought this issue, among others, 14 to
the fore. Because of this increased focus on mental health in IHEs,
both administrators and lawmakers have the unprecedented
opportunity to re-examine the way that laws and policies affect and
deal with students suffering from mental illness. As it stands, IHEs
are unclear as to when they will be held liable and what sorts of
precautions might fulfill any duty they have to prevent harm to their
students. 5 This Comment focuses on how proposals designed to
more clearly define the scope of an IHE's responsibility and liability
with regard to students with mental illness will enable administrators
to more effectively support and protect individuals on campus.
Part I of this piece discusses the fact that IHEs are faced with an
increasing number of people with mental health problems and are
struggling to develop appropriate measures to help troubled students.
Part II presents the vast and often confusing legal landscape of
institutional liability in regard to harm suffered by students on
campus at the hands of their mentally-ill classmates. While
commentators insist that colleges have been relieved of supervisory
responsibility for their students, 6 there has been a "duty-imposing
trend" in recent years which suggests that colleges still bear a
substantial legal burden. Part III outlines the current state of
information privacy and disability laws and suggests that if
universities are ultimately held responsible for student harms, they
24, 2007, at A7 (stating that risks and contingencies will always be present in life, and
despite popular American belief, there is not always a solution for every problem).
14. The other issues include such things as the adequacy and effectiveness of gun
control policy, campus security, emergency notification/evacuation plans on campus, and
student criminal background checks. See generally VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1
(discussing the Virginia Tech massacre and some of the campus safety issues that need to
be addressed in the wake of that tragedy).
15. See infra notes 172-84 and accompanying text.
16. See Peter F. Lake, The Special Relationship(s) Between a College and a Student:
Law and Policy Ramifications for the Post In Loco Parentis College, 37 IDAHo L. REV.
531, 532-33 (2001).
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must be afforded the necessary tools and flexibility within those
privacy and disability laws to protect students from harm and
themselves from liability. These suggestions include encouraging
university administrators and staff to communicate more freely
regarding the mental health status of students, allowing institutions to
know more about their students' mental health history before the
students arrive on campus, permitting institutions to mandate
counseling, and even removing from campus those students deemed a
serious threat to themselves or others. In summary, this Comment
will address how changes in federal privacy and disability law,
together with new institutional procedures, can help universities
prevent the conditions that set the Virginia Tech tragedy in motion.
I. CAMPUS MENTAL HEALTH CRISIS
The April 2007 shooting at Virginia Tech brought mental illness
to the fore-it is an issue that deserves national attention because the
stakes are so high. Mental illness has become much more prevalent
among college students in recent years, and administrators have
expressed concern with how to effectively support and invest in an
"undergraduate population that requires both more coddling and
more actual mental health care than ever before."17 In 2005, ninety
percent of college counseling directors reported steady increases in
the number of students with mental health problems, including severe
depression, bipolar disorder, and psychotic breakdowns. 8 This
Comment argues that students with a history of mental illness should
be identified as early as possible in order to avoid reactionary
17. Deborah Sontag, Who Was Responsible for Elizabeth Shin?, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 28,
2002, § 6 (Magazine), at 58 (stating that administrators are "scrambling to redefine their
relationship with parents and their role in the nonacademic lives of students who are
adults by many yardsticks, and yet not quite").
18. See ROBERT P. GALLAGHER, NATIONAL SURVEY OF COUNSELING CENTER
DIRECTORS 4 (2005), available at http://www.education.pitt.edu/survey/nsccd/archive/
2005/monograph.pdf (reporting that ninety-five percent of student counseling directors
have noticed an increase in students coming to counseling who are already on psychiatric
medication); see also Joan Arehart-Treichel, Mental Illness on Rise on College Campuses,
PSYCHIATRIC NEWS, Mar. 15, 2002, at 6, available at http://pn.psychiatryonline.org/cgi/
content/full/37/6/6 (quoting Morton Silverman, M.D., director of student mental health at
the University of Chicago, as stating that "[m]ore individuals with a history of mental
health problems are attending colleges. So they are coming to us with their problems; it is
not that they are developing them when they are here."); Eleanor Yang Su, Colleges
Weigh Privacy, Liability as Demand Rises for Counseling, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Apr.
20, 2007, available at http:l/www.signonsandiego.comnews/education/20070420-9999-
ln20counsel.html (quoting Reina Juarez, director of counseling services at the University
of California San Diego, as stating that "[w]e see more students with bipolar disorders and
depression .... We are seeing more psychotic breakdowns.").
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measures and disagreeable choices. It also recognizes the reality that
schools will inevitably have to react to situations as well-and in
those moments, they should be afforded the necessary tools to help
keep the troubled student in school and receiving treatment and
counseling while at the same time maintaining a safe environment for
others on campus.
According to counselors and mental health experts, one reason
for the increase in student mental illness is the advancement in
medical treatment and medications for mental illnesses.19 Before
modern-day medical advances were available, many students with
diagnosed mental illnesses were prevented from pursuing a college-
level education because their illnesses made it difficult, if not
impossible, to thrive in a college setting."z Now, with the help of
medication and counseling, many of them are staying in school and
getting into college.21 In addition to recent medical advances, other
explanations for the rise in mental illness on campus include a society
more accepting of counseling, an expansion in mental health services
at IHEs, an often crippling combination of stressors such as enormous
college loan burdens and global competition for jobs, and a more
sheltered upbringing for the current generation of students, making
their transition to independent life on campus all the more
challenging.2"
One upsetting manifestation of the increase in mental illness on
campus is suicide. More than 1,100 suicides occur on college
campuses every year, making it the third leading cause of death
among college-aged individuals.23 Yet, suicide is not the only sign of
19. See Ann Pollinger Haas et al., Suicide in College Students, 46 AM. BEHAV.
SCIENTIST 1224, 1229 (2003).
20. See Kate Kelly, Lost on the Campus, TIME, Jan. 15, 2001, at 51, 52. In her
interview with Time Magazine, Johns Hopkins psychologist Kay Redfield Jamison
explained that "[tihe very effectiveness of modern treatment means that a lot of people
who never would have made it into college are stable enough to go to universities ....
[Colleges] are dealing with a lot of kids who are very sick." Id.
21. See Su, supra note 18.
22. Id. (quoting Robert Gallagher, who directed the University of Pittsburgh
counseling center for twenty-five years, as saying that a "number of people believe that
the last generation of students has been treated with kid gloves[,] ... [has been]
overprotected by family," and, when faced with the real world, "can't deal with the
stresses they encounter").
23. The majority of those students are not receiving medical treatment at the time of
death. See THE JED FOUNDATION, STATISTICS ON DEPRESSION AND SUICIDE AMONG
COLLEGE ADOLESCENTS OF COLLEGE AGE, http://www.jedfoundation.org/
libraryNews-facts.php (last visited Nov. 10, 2008); see also Lisa C. Barrios et al., Suicide
Ideation Among U.S. College Students: Associations with Other Injury Risk Behaviors, 48
J. AM. C. HEALTH 229, 229 (2000) (noting that other leading causes of death among
college aged students, including homicide and unintentional injury, are sometimes linked
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student mental health problems on campus. Mental illness manifests
itself in other self-destructive behavior as well. For example, one
study published in the Journal of American College Health found
that suicidal ideation frequently correlates with unhealthy and
reckless conduct such as risky sexual behavior, drinking and driving,
and engaging in criminal behavior that would provoke law
enforcement officers to discharge weapons.24
Moreover, according to studies performed by the National
Institute of Mental Health, suicide attempts and suicide deaths may
involve serious violence against others.25 In fact, criminal violence on
campus perpetrated by mentally-ill students, whether suicidal or
otherwise, is a disturbing reality that IHEs have been dealing with for
years. Cho's was not the first murderous rampage whereby
individuals on campus lost their lives at the hands of a mentally-ill
student. Five years before the Virginia Tech shooting, a deeply
disturbed graduate student diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia
went on a shooting spree at the Appalachian School of Law, killing
three and wounding three more. 6 In 2002, a failing student at the
University of Arizona Nursing College walked into an instructor's
office and fatally shot her.27 He then proceeded to a classroom where
he shot and killed two more of his instructors before fatally shooting
himself.28 In 1992, while defending his thesis, graduate engineering
student Frederick Davidson shot and killed three of his San Diego
State University professors.29 Three years later, Wendell Williamson,
a third-year law student at the University of North Carolina, opened
fire near campus, killing two individuals.30 And on February 15, 2008,
to suicide ideation); Paul Joffe, An Empirically Supported Program to Prevent Suicide in a
College Student Population, 38 SUICIDE & LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 87, 87 (2008)
("[F]rom the 14.9 million students enrolled in 2001, approximately 1100 young adults kill
themselves in the nation's colleges and universities every year.").
24. See Barrios et al., supra note 23, at 229.
25. See id.
26. See Francis X. Clines, 3 Slain at Law School: Student Is Held, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 17,
2002, at A18. Graduate student Peter Odighizuwa had been recently dismissed from
school because of failing grades. Id.
27. See John M. Broder, Arizona Gunman Chose Victims in Advance, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 30, 2002, at A20.
28. See id.
29. See Dennis Overbye, When Student-Adviser Tensions Erupt, the Results Can Be
Fatal, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2007, at F3. The gunman is now serving three life sentences.
Id.
30. See N. Carolina Law Student Kills 2 With Rifle, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1995, at A19.
Williamson had been diagnosed as "paranoid schizophrenic" by Dr. Myron Liptzin, a
college psychiatrist, prior to the incident. Id. He was later found not guilty by reason of
insanity and is currently confined to state mental hospitals. Id.
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less than one year after the Virginia Tech massacre, Stephen
Kazmierczak, a former graduate student at the University of
Northern Illinois, opened fire on an auditorium full of students,
"spray[ing] more than fifty rounds of buckshot and bullets at
panicked students before turning one of his weapons on himself."31
Six people, including the killer, died that day and sixteen were
wounded.32
Along with the increasing incidence of mental illness and related
crimes on campus comes the increasing threat of liability for IHEs
when students to whom the universities owe a duty of protection
become the victims of these violent outbreaks. Universities have
become a frequent target for a variety of legal claims in recent years.33
One factor contributing to the increase in university-related lawsuits
is a general perception of universities as wealthy organizations with
virtually unlimited resources. This perception is only partly correct.34
Many universities actually operate on relatively small endowments.
Moreover, society has grown more litigious in general and more
cynical towards charitable organizations specifically.36
Consequently, IHEs have struggled to develop appropriate
measures to simultaneously help troubled students and protect
themselves from institutional liability. School responses to the
Virginia Tech tragedy and this most recent shooting in Northern
Illinois have ranged from high-tech emergency notification systems to
stricter security measures to increased resources devoted to
31. See Kari Lydersen & Theresa Vargas, Illinois College Applied Lessons from
Massacre at Virginia Tech, WASH. POST, Feb. 16, 2008, at Al.
32. See id.
33. See Eileen M. Evans & William D. Evans, Jr., "No Good Deed Goes
Unpunished:" Personal Liability of Trustees and Administrators of Private Colleges and
Universities, 33 TORT & INS. L. J. 1107, 1107 (1998). One example is student suicide
litigation. Whereas only one or two suicide cases used to be all that was pending at any
given time, "[t]oday the cases total about 10 nationwide, with the prospect that many more
suicides could, over time, move into the courts." Ann H. Franke, When Students Kill
Themselves, Colleges May Get the Blame, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., June 25, 2004, at B18.
34. Large, prestigious private institutions like Harvard University and Yale boast of
$35 billion and $22.5 billion endowments, respectively. See Alan Finder, Yale Plans to
Increase Spending from Its Endowment, with Financial Aid to Benefit, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8,
2008, at A12.
35. In relation to their private school counterparts, public institution endowments are
much smaller (many large public universities have endowments of $2 billion or less). See
Goldie Blumenstyk, Endowments Savor Big Gains but Lower Their Sights, CHRON. OF
HIGHER EDUC., Feb. 1, 2008, at Al.
36. See Evans & Evans, supra note 33, at 1108 ("Given the 'deep pocket' nature of
many private colleges, our litigious society, and public cynicism about all charitable
institutions, claims against private institutions and their managers will continue to rise.").
2008]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 87
counseling and mental health services.37 These measures, though
well-intentioned and certainly helpful,38 are largely reactionary and
may be too late to prevent harm to faculty, staff, and students on
campus.39 Moreover, measures taken in response to troubling student
behavior often require the school to make "the difficult choice of
taking on the role of mental health care provider or dismissing the
student from campus altogether."4 Neither of these is an agreeable
choice for the school or the student.4'
II. THE COLLEGE-STUDENT RELATIONSHIP: THEORIES OF
INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY
This section reviews the legal analyses which courts undertake in
responding to claims that IHEs should be responsible for protecting
their students and employees from harm on campus. No bright,
definitive lines are discernable-only a suggested trend towards
expanded liability for IHEs.42
37. For example, on its university website, Sacramento State announces: "In light of
university emergencies such as the tragedy at Virginia Tech, as well as a mandate from the
California State University Chancellor's Office, Sacramento State will debut its
Emergency Notification System that automates delivery of urgent announcements." See
SACRAMENTO STATE UNIVERSITY, EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SYSTEM,
http://www.csus.edu/ens/ (last visited Nov. 10, 2008); see also Nancy Shute, A Wake-Up
Call on Campus: Virginia Tech Has Inspired Counseling Services to Reassess, U.S. NEWS
& WORLD REP., Sept. 13, 2007, http://health.usnews.com/articles/health/20O7/09/13/a-
wake-up-call-on-campus.html ("Galvanized by the April tragedy at Virginia Tech ...
colleges and universities around the country are urgently taking stock of the reach and
effectiveness of their mental-health services.").
38. This was demonstrated in the effective and timely response of campus police to
the recent shooting at Northern Illinois University. Police arrived on the scene only thirty
seconds after the shooter opened fire. See Lydersen & Vargas, supra note 31.
39. "By the time a school learns about a troubled student ... the student is often
already in crisis." See Posting of Bob Smith & Dana Fleming to NKMS blog, Lessons
Learned from Virginia Tech, http://www.nkms.com/collegeblog/index.php?p=278 (Aug. 24,
2007, 3:12 EST).
40. See id.
41. This Comment argues that the goal should be to identify and begin counseling
students as early as possible in order to keep them enrolled and on campus. A student
who suffers from a debilitating mental illness, one so advanced that it renders her
incapable of attending class and living on campus, clearly needs quality healthcare. But if
the student is dismissed from school, she frequently loses the student healthcare benefits
so desperately needed. Moreover, sending a student home might very well be sending her
into the hands of individuals who substantially contribute to that student's illness.
42. But see GARY PAVELA, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON COLLEGE STUDENT
SUICIDE: A LAW AND POLICY PERSPECTIVE 7 (2006) (asserting that "[s]uggestions of a
'trend' toward expansion of duty in college student suicide cases may prove true in the
end, but seem premature at present").
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Courts generally refuse to hold a third party liable for the costs
of damages to the victim of a crime.43 The same goes for third-party
responsibility for another's suicide.44 Nonetheless, a plaintiff may
succeed in a claim of liability against the university upon proof of the
existence of very specific circumstances: 1) the university owed a
duty to prevent harm to the plaintiff; 2) the university breached that
duty; 3) the plaintiff was injured; and 4) if the university had not acted
or failed to act as it did, the plaintiff would not have been injured (i.e.,
causation).45 This analysis focuses on the first and fourth prongs of
this liability test because these two prongs are generally the most
difficult to prove.
A. The Source of Duty
The analysis begins by determining whether the university owes
an affirmative duty to prevent harm to the student.46 Under § 314A
of the Restatement (Second) of Torts ("Restatement"), 47  an
affirmative duty to protect another from the criminal or wrongful acts
of third persons will only arise under unusual circumstances, such as
when a "special relationship" exists between the parties. Examples of
such a special relationship include "common carrier-passenger,
business proprietor-invitee, and innkeeper-guest. "48
The existence of an affirmative duty stems from the way the
courts frame the relationship between the university and the
student.49 There are four primary theories by which courts attempt to
43. See 57A AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 96 (2008) ("Generally and in the absence of
statute or of special relationship or circumstances, an individual has no duty to protect
another from a criminal assault or willful act of violence of a third person.").
44. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text.
45. 38 AM. JUR. 2D Negligence § 2 (2008).
46. The scope of this paper is designed to focus on the relationship and resulting duty
between university and student.
47. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A (1965).
48. See Klingbeil Mgmt. Group Co. v. Vito, 357 S.E.2d 200, 201 (Va. 1987).
49. Courts generally look to either a set of facts establishing a duty under tort law or
to a contract creating the duty. See Brian Jackson, The Lingering Legacy of In Loco
Parentis: An Historical Survey and Proposal for Reform, 44 VAND. L. REV. 1135, 1148-49
(1991); Theodore C. Stamatakos, The Doctrine of In Loco Parentis, Tort Liability and the
Student-College Relationship, 65 IND. L.J. 471, 476-78 (1990). This paper focuses on the
duties arising under tort law, as there is much overlap with contract law, particularly in the
duty-imposing theories of landowner-invitee and landlord-tenant. The theory of duty-
imposed-by-contract focuses on the student as consumer.
As American society has developed, new demands have been placed upon colleges
and universities by their primary constituency, the student, for less paternalism
and more accountability for services rendered. This dynamic relationship can be
characterized by a judicial evolution from a time in which the university stood in
20081
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define the relationship between a university and its students and to
identify the duty, if any, arising from that relationship." The first
theory is the in loco parentis doctrine, whereby IHEs are treated as
standing in the place of the parent.5 The second theory analogizes
the college-student relationship to that of a landowner-invitee and the
third, to that of a landlord-tenant. These three relationships have
been established as "special relationships" as a matter of law.52 The
fourth theory focuses on whether a relationship is "special" based on
a specific set of circumstances resulting in an affirmative duty owed
by the defendant where no such duty would otherwise exist.53
i. The In Loco Parentis Doctrine
Traditionally, IHEs were thought to stand in loco parentis to
students. This meant that educational institutions owed to their
students the duty of a parent to a child. Courts not only viewed IHEs
as educators but also as guardians and champions of students' health,
welfare, safety, and morals. 4 Standing in for the parent, university
authorities were free to make any rule regarding their students that a
parent could make for the same purpose, and the courts were loathe
to second-guess administrators' discretion unless the rules were
"unlawful or against public policy."55
loco parentis, or in the place of the parent, to the current contractual perspective,
in which the student represents a consumer and the university the provider.
K.B. Melear, From In Loco Parentis to Consumerism: A Legal Analysis of the Contractual
Relationship Between Institution and Student, 40 NASPA J. 124, 125 (2003), available at
http://publications.naspa.org/naspajournal/aimsandscoe.html.
50. Other analytical models include contract-imposed duties (both express and
implied) and fiduciary duties. See Stamatakos, supra note 49, at 476-79.
51. Literally, "in the place of a parent." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 803 (8th ed.
2004).
52. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A.
53. See infra Part I.A.iv.
54. See, e.g. Gott v. Berea Coll., 161 S.W. 204, 206 (Ky. 1913) (upholding a school's
discretionary right to prohibit student attendance at local bars because college authorities
"stand in loco parentis concerning the physical and moral welfare and mental training of
the pupils"); see also People ex rel. Pratt v. Wheaton Coll., 40 Ill. 186, 187 (1886) ("A
discretionary power has been given,... [and] we have no more authority to interfere than
we have to control the domestic discipline of a father in his family."); Woods v. Simpson,
126 A. 882, 883 (Md. 1924) (stating that college officers "must, of necessity, be left
untrammeled in handling the problems which arise, as their judgment and discretion may
dictate").
55. See Berea Coll., 161 S.W. at 206. The doctrine of in loco parentis justified the
courts' nonintervention in claims brought by students seeking legal remedies for school
disputes. See Jackson, supra note 49, at 1144 (explaining that, under the in loco parentis
doctrine, "[j]ust as children usually cannot sue their parents, the courts ordinarily deprived
students of redress in disputes with their colleges").
[Vol. 87
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The doctrine of in loco parentis was firmly entrenched in
American jurisprudence into the 1960s and 1970s until the Vietnam
War protests, the Civil Rights Movement, and the passage of the
Twenty-Sixth Amendment (which lowered the age of majority from
twenty-one to eighteen) transformed America's perception of college
students.56 Students demanded that they be viewed as adults in their
own right, as opposed to children under the care of their parents or
college authorities. This widespread social change led to the gradual
abandonment of the in loco parentis doctrine. In 1979, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals recognized the dawn of a new legal era for
colleges and students in Bradshaw v. Rawlings.5 7  Holding that
Delaware Valley College did not owe a duty of custodial care to the
student, the court explained that "the modern American college is
not an insurer of the safety of its students," and the "authoritarian
role of today's college administration[] has been notably diluted in
recent decades."58 Shortly thereafter, Baldwin v. Zoradi59 emphasized
56. See Joey Johnson, Premature Emancipation? Disempowering College Parents
Under FERPA, 55 DRAKE L. REV. 1057, 1073 (2007) ("Unfortunately, the newly
empowered student body was no more accountable, as a growing number of students
unapologetically approached college as a pleasant interlude between the end of
adolescence and the assumption of adult responsibilities.") (internal quotations omitted).
57. 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979).
There was a time when college administrators and faculties assumed a role in loco
parentis. Students were committed to their charge because the students were
considered minors. A special relationship was created between college and
student that imposed a duty on the college to exercise control over student
conduct and, reciprocally, gave the students certain rights of protection by the
college. The campus revolutions of the late sixties and early seventies were a
direct attack by the students on rigid controls by the colleges and were an all-
pervasive affirmative demand for more student rights. In general, the students
succeeded, peaceably and otherwise, in acquiring a new status at colleges
throughout the country.
Id. at 139.
58. Id. at 138.
59. 176 Cal. Rptr. 809 (Cal. Ct. App. 5th 1981). A student brought a negligence action
against the college after suffering injuries that occurred while the student was a passenger
in a car that crashed during a speeding contest. Id. at 811-12. The court stated that the
proper role of postsecondary education was the maturation of the students, and it
concluded that students are responsible for their own decisions. Id. at 818. Similarly, in
Beach v. University of Utah, a student sued the college for injuries sustained on a school-
sponsored trip. See 726 P.2d 413, 413 (Utah 1986). The student was intoxicated at the
time of injury. See id. at 413. The court held there was no duty because the college does
not take the place of the parent, and the university does not regulate the lives of its
students. Id. at 419 n.5. The Beach court qualified its ruling:
[A]n institution might ... choose to require of students certain standards of
behavior in their personal lives and subject them to discipline for failing to meet
those standards. However, the fact that a student might accept those conditions
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
the court's policy behind its abandonment of the in loco parentis
doctrine.6' The Baldwin court believed preservation of the doctrine
would have an adverse effect on student education and emotional
development because "[o]nly by giving them responsibilities can
students grow into responsible adulthood."'"
After abandoning the in loco parentis doctrine, courts have been
reluctant to find a special relationship between IHEs and students
and have hesitated to impose liability on universities for harms caused
by their students, to themselves or to other individuals on campus.
Whereas courts have still recognized a special relationship between a
school and a student at the secondary school level, where schools still
stand in loco parentis,62 they have only narrowly applied the concept
of a special relationship to universities where in loco parentis has
been abandoned.63 The remaining theories represent the other means
by which courts may find a special relationship.
ii. Landowner-Invitee
Some courts have compared the college-student relationship to
that of landowner-invitee.64 Advocates of this theory suggest that
IHEs might be liable to their students by reference to § 314A(3) of
the Restatement 65 which provides that a possessor of land who holds
it open to the public is under a duty to protect its invitees against any
unreasonable risk of physical harm.66  Under the landowner-invitee
on attendance at the institution would not change the character of their
relationship; the student would still be an adult and responsible for his or her
behavior. Neither attendance at college nor agreement to submit to certain
behavior standards makes the student less an autonomous adult or the institution
more a caretaker.
Id.
60. Baldwin, 176 Cal. Rptr. at 818.
61. Id. (defending its abandonment of in loco parentis by explaining that "[tihe
transfer of prerogatives and rights from college administrators to the students is salubrious
when seen in the context of a proper goal of postsecondary education-the maturation of
the students.... Although the alleged lack of supervision had a disastrous result to this
plaintiff, the overall policy of stimulating student growth is in the public interest.").
62. See, e.g., Peter Lake & Nancy Tribbensee, The Emerging Crisis of College Student
Suicide: Law and Policy Responses to Serious Forms of Self-inflicted Injury, 32 STETSON
L. REV. 125, 132 (2002).
63. See id.
64. See, e.g., Peterson v. S.F. Cmty. Coll. Dist., 685 P.2d 1193, 1198 (Cal. 1984) (noting
that a student's status as invitee and the college's status as landowner created a special
relationship to impose a duty on the college to protect the students).
65. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 314A(d) (1965).
66. See, e.g., Bearman v. Univ. of Notre Dame, 453 N.E.2d 1196, 1198 (Ind. Ct. App.
1983) ("Notre Dame is under a duty to take reasonable precautions to protect those who
attend its football games from injury caused by the acts of third persons.").
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theory, however, owners or occupiers of land generally have no duty
to protect invitees on their property from the criminal acts of third
parties.67 The policy driving this rule is that the social and economic
consequences of placing a duty on an individual or entity would be
too great considering that the foreseeability of the risk of harm is
usually slight and difficult to prove.6"
Under this theory, liability arises when the landowner
unreasonably creates or increases the risk of injury or should have
known from past experience that the visitor's safety would be
compromised.69 Such an inquiry generally relies on an owner having
witnessed past acts of the third party that are similar in nature to the
one that resulted in injury to the invitee in question. The California
case Peterson v. San Francisco Community College District"° provides
a clear example of the application of this theory.7 While climbing a
stairway from a campus parking lot to her dorm, Kathleen Peterson, a
San Francisco Community College student, was assaulted.72 Not only
was the stairway overgrown with untrimmed foliage, but the college
knew of similar assaults in the area and had failed to warn students or
take other precautions to prevent further attacks.73 Because the
college knew of prior incidents but neglected to trim back the foliage
or warn students of the risk, the Peterson court held the college liable
for the assault.74 In justifying its position, the court emphasized the
role of a student's expectation that the university would at least not
67. See 62 AM. JUR. 2D Premises Liability § 409 (2008).
68. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Lawless, 570 S.E.2d 631, 633 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002) (holding
that a premises owner's knowledge that the neighbor was "mean" when he had been
drinking did not put the owner on notice that the neighbor was prone to deadly violence
with a handgun, and the owner was therefore not held liable for the death of a social guest
who was shot and killed by the neighbor). The McDaniel court explained that "the duty to
exercise ordinary care to guard against injury caused by dangerous characters" only
extended to "those criminal acts that were foreseeable." Id. "Any prior event that is
relied upon to establish foreseeability must be substantially similar, but not identical, to
the subsequent criminal act." Id. (internal citations omitted); see also Peterson, 685 P.2d at
1196 (listing "the extent of the burden to the defendant and consequences to the
community" as one factor to be weighed in determining whether a duty to exercise care
existed).
69. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (1965) (stating that the
landowner is "under no duty to exercise any care until he knows or has reason to know
that the acts of the third person are occurring, or are about to occur.... If the place or
character of his business, or his past experience, is such that he should reasonably
anticipate careless or criminal conduct on the part of third persons,... he many be under a
duty to take precautions against it.").
70. 685 P.2d 1193 (Cal. 1984).
71. See id. at 1200-01.
72. See id. at 1195.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 1200-01.
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contribute to or increase the risk of crime. "In the closed
environment of a school campus where students ... spend a
significant portion of their time and may in fact live, they can
reasonably expect that ... school authorities will also exercise
reasonable care to keep the campus free from conditions which
increase the risk of crime. 75
Some scholars suggest that Virginia Tech may have had a duty to
its invitees, arising from its position as landowner.76 However, one
might argue that the requisite foreseeability was missing in Virginia
Tech's case. Unlike in Peterson, where the university was aware of
past incidents and put on notice, Virginia Tech had no prior
knowledge of similar attacks-that is, it had no knowledge that Cho
was ever outwardly hostile or violent before the day of the attack,
though his writings and behavior might have suggested his capability
of performing such criminal acts.77 Moreover, during Cho's overnight
stay at the Carilion St. Albans Behavioral Health Center, a
professional evaluated Cho and determined he was not an immediate
threat to himself or society.7s Regardless of whether this landowner-
invitee model applies to the specific facts of the Virginia Tech
tragedy, student victims and their parents have the option to bring a
claim against an IHE under the landowner-invitee theory, provided
the facts indicate that the school had contributed to or knowingly
ignored a substantial risk of harm. This theory of liability should be
approached with caution because of the court's strict foreseeability
requirement. Even if a plaintiff is unsuccessful in arguing the IHE, as
landowner, owed the student a special duty as an "invitee" on its
campus, the plaintiff might still prevail under another liability theory,
such as that of landlord-tenant.
75. See id. at 1201.
76. See, e.g., Anthony Sebok, Could Virginia Tech Be Held Liable for Cho Seung
Hui's Shootings, If an Investigation Were to Reveal It Had Been Negligent?,
FINDLAW.COM, Apr. 24, 2007, http://writ.news.findlaw.com/sebok/20070424.html. Sebok,
a law professor at Brooklyn Law School, makes the argument that Virginia Tech, as
landowner, might have had certain duties to its invitees, including the duty to protect its
students from criminal conduct by Cho. Id. He uses as an example the case of Thompson
v. Skate America, 540 S.E.2d 123 (Va. 2001), whereby the Supreme Court of Virginia held
that a skating rink operator in the state of Virginia could be held liable for an assault by
one patron on another if the attacker "was known to [the skating rink] to be violent and to
have committed assaults on other invitees on its property in the recent past." Id. at 128.
77. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 49-52.
78. Id. at 47.
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iii. Landlord-Tenant
Because students often live on campus in university-owned
housing, the landlord-tenant theory of liability might provide an
alternative basis for establishing a duty-imposing relationship
between the university and its students. Not surprisingly, courts
choose this analogy most often when dealing with injuries occurring
in the dormitory. One of the earliest decisions to find enhanced
liability on the part of the university as landlord was Miller v. State.79
A nineteen-year-old student raped in her dormitory room brought a
claim against the State University of New York ("SUNY"), and the
New York Court of Appeals, overturning the lower court decision,
found SUNY liable for not doing more to protect its "tenant"
students in the dormitory."0 At about 6:00 a.m., while in the laundry
room of her dormitory, the victim in Miller was approached by a man
"wielding a large butcher knife."'" After blindfolding the student, the
man led her out of the laundry room and through an unlocked outer
door, back in through another unlocked entrance to the residence
hall, and up the stairs into a dormitory room. 2 There, she was "raped
twice at knifepoint." 3  Many students, including the claimant, had
complained previously to the dormitory manager and campus security
about nonresidents, especially men, loitering in the dormitory
lounges, hallways, and women's bathrooms. 4  Despite these
complaints and stories published in the school newspaper reporting
crimes in the dormitories such as armed robbery and a rape by a non-
student, the doors of all ten entrances to the dormitory building were
purposefully kept unlocked at all hours.8 The lower court therefore
found that, "by failing to lock the outer doors of the dormitory, the
State [] breached its duty to protect its tenants from reasonably
foreseeable criminal assaults by outsiders ... [and the] failure to lock
the outer doors was.., a proximate cause of the rape."8 6
Notwithstanding the ruling in Miller, "[g]enerally, the landlord-
tenant relationship in and of itself does not create a duty on the part
of a landlord to protect its tenants from harm caused by intentional or
79. 467 N.E.2d 493 (N.Y. 1984).
80. Id. at 497 ("A landlord has a duty to maintain minimal security measures, related
to a specific building itself, in the face of foreseeable criminal intrusion upon tenants.").
81. Id. at 494.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 495.
85. Id.
86. Id. Moreover, the lower court refused to hold the claimant, who was "in the
laundry room after sunrise on a Sunday morning," contributorily negligent. Id.
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criminal acts of third persons."" A landlord may voluntarily assume
certain duties, however, by holding himself out as a provider or
insurer of safety.8 What constitutes a "voluntary assumption" of
these duties is less clear. For example, in Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan
University,9 the court found that the fact that the university outfitted
its building with security devices such as alarms and employed
security personnel such as doormen and night-guards "did not rise to
the level of a contractual obligation on the part of the university" to
provide protection against the type of injury incurred by the
plaintiff.9" The plaintiff's complaint averred that she suffered physical
injuries by another student ("Wilk") when the plaintiff, who was in
her dormitory room, was called by Wilk to come to the dormitory
lobby; when she arrived, she was "forcibly grabbed and thr[own]"
over Wilk's shoulder.91 Wilk "was to run through a gauntlet of
[fraternity] members," with the plaintiff on his shoulders, while his
fraternity brothers would "strike him with bones as he passed."92 As
Wilk ran, he stumbled and fell, "crushing the skull, head and body of
[the plaintiff] on the sidewalk."93
Under the landlord-tenant liability theory articulated in Miller v.
State and qualified by Rabel v. Illinois Wesleyan University, Virginia
Tech would likely fair well, assuming that Virginia courts would even
recognize an expanded duty of care for universities towards their
tenant students. Under the landlord-tenant theory, the families of the
two students killed by Cho in West Ambler Johnston dormitory could
bring a claim against the university asserting that, as landlord,
Virginia Tech owed a heightened duty of care to its tenant students to
protect them from third-party criminal conduct. In response, Virginia
Tech could argue that, unlike in Miller, where the university left the
dormitory building doors unlocked, it kept West Ambler Johnson
87. Rabel v. Ill. Wesleyan Univ., 514 N.E.2d 552, 561 (Ill. App. Ct. 1987).
88. Id. at 562 (explaining that a landlord who performs this voluntarily-acquired duty
negligently might be held liable for the intentional or criminal acts of third persons).
89. 514 N.E.2d 552 (111. App. Ct. 1987).
90. Id. at 562 (emphasis added).
In determining whether the law imposes a duty, foreseeability of possible harm
alone is not the test, for in retrospect almost every occurrence may appear to be
foreseeable. The likelihood of injury from the existence of a condition, the
magnitude of guarding against it, and consequences of placing the burden upon
the defendant must be taken into account.
Id. at 557 (quoting Barnes v. Washington, 305 N.E.2d 535, 539 (Il. 1973)).
91. Id. at 554.
92. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting plaintiff's complaint).
93. Id. (internal quotations omitted) (alteration in original) (quoting plaintiffs
complaint).
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dormitory and other on-campus residence halls locked, requiring key
card access between the hours of 10:00 p.m. and 10:00 a.m. The
Virginia Tech Review Panel observed that "[t]his level of security is
quite typical of many campuses across the nation in rural areas with
low crime rates."94  Virginia Tech could further argue that such
precautionary measures, according to the court in Rabel, do not "rise
to the level of a contractual obligation" on Virginia Tech to provide
protection against the type of injury incurred by the victim, that is, an
armed assault on residents by a mentally-ill student."
Because the landlord-tenant theory of liability is so limited, and
because several jurisdictions fail to even recognize it, many plaintiffs
alternatively claim that a special relationship has been established
between an IHE and student, giving rise to liability. This fourth and
final theory of liability is discussed in greater detail below.
iv. Case-by-Case Determined Special Relationships
In recent years, courts have demonstrated that they are willing to
find a basis for liability arising out of a "special relationship" between
an IHE and its student.96 This relationship is based on the particular,
94. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 13.
95. Virginia Tech would likely argue sovereign immunity as well, though not all state-
supported universities enjoy this same privilege. In cases involving actions against public
institutions such as a state-funded university, governmental immunity doctrines may bar
recovery irrespective of the defendant's behavior. See Pentecost v. Old Dominion Univ.,
61 Va. Cir. 270, 273 (Cir. Ct. 2003) ("The doctrine of sovereign immunity is 'alive and well'
in Virginia."). Many Virginia courts have found state-supported universities to be
immune from suit. See, e.g., Halberstam v. Commonwealth, 467 S.E.2d 783, 784 (Va.
1996) (noting that the trial court applied the sovereign immunity doctrine to George
Mason University, finding it immune from suit); Messina v. Burden, 321 S.E.2d 657, 660
(Va. 1984) (applying the sovereign immunity doctrine to the Frederick Campus of
Tidewater Community College). But see James v. Jane, 282 S.E.2d 864, 870 (Va. 1980)
(refusing to apply the doctrine of sovereign immunity to licensed physicians who were
medical school faculty members at the University of Virginia).
96. See Valerie Kravets Cohen, Note, Keeping Students Alive: Mandating On-Campus
Counseling Saves Suicidal College Students' Lives and Limits Liability, 75 FORDHAM L.
REV. 3081, 3087 (2007); see also Lake, supra note 16, at 535 ("The courts appear to be
saying there is no general special relationship, but students do have specific duty-creating
relationships with IHE's, some of which are legally 'special.' "). Plaintiffs alleging that a
"special relationship" exists between an IHE and student usually bring suit against
individuals employed by the university, such as psychologists, school counselors, or the
Dean of Students. For example, in Bogust v. Iverson, Jeannie Bogust obtained mental
health treatment and committed suicide at Stout State College. See 102 N.W.2d 228, 229
(Wis. 1960). Jeannie's parents sued Ralph Iverson, Director of Student Personnel Services
and Professor of Education with a Ph.D. degree, for "fail[ing] to secure or attempt to
secure emergency psychiatric treatment" for Jeannie, failing to advise Jeannie's parents
"concerning the true mental and emotional state of their said daughter," and suggesting
that Jeannie terminate her counseling six weeks prior to her suicide. Id. at 229 (quoting
plaintiff's complaint). In a much more recent case, a Massachusetts Superior Court
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unique facts of the situation instead of on a pre-defined relationship
like landowner-invitee or landlord-tenant.97 Peter Lake, a professor
at Stetson University College of Law, highlights the murkiness of
such a doctrine:
[C]ourts continue to hold that adult college students are not in
a special relationship with an IHE, except when they are. The
courts appear to be saying there is no general special
relationship, but students do have specific duty-creating
relationships with IHEs, some of which are legally "special"...
giving rise to a duty of reasonable care.98
This special, case-specific relationship is most often seen in
suicide-related cases, whereby plaintiffs allege that an IHE either
failed to recognize suicide warning signs or recognized but failed to
respond appropriately to the warning signs.99 Although a third party
generally is not held liable for another's suicide, damages may be
awarded (1) where "the defendant is somehow found to have actually
caused the suicide" or (2) where "the defendant is found to have had
a duty to prevent the suicide from occurring" because of a special
relationship it formed with the student.100
The first exception, where a defendant is found to have caused
the suicide, is rarely established. 1 ' If a defendant intentionally inflicts
severe physical, mental, or emotional injury, which in turn leads the
injured individual to a state of mental illness that ends in suicide, the
allowed the deceased student's parents to sue two non-clinician administrators for failure
to prevent their daughter's suicide. See Shin v. Mass. Inst. of Tech., No. 020403, 2005 WL
1869101, at *13 (Mass. June 27, 2005); see also infra notes 116-22 and accompanying text.
97. See Thompson ex. rel. Thompson v. Skate Am., Inc., 540 S.E.2d 123, 127 (Va.
2001) (" '[S]pecial relationships' may exist between particular plaintiffs and defendants,
either as a matter of law or because of the particular factual circumstances in a given
case.").
98. See Lake, supra note 16, at 535.
99. See Cohen, supra note 96, at 3086-3101. For many years, the law categorically
refused to recognize third-party liability arising out of a failure to prevent suicide. See
Victor E. Schwartz, Civil Liability for Causing Suicide: A Synthesis of Law and Psychiatry,
24 VAND. L. REV. 217, 217-18 (1971); see also Margot 0. Knuth, Comment, Civil Liability
for Causing or Failing to Prevent Suicide, 12 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 967, 967-68 (1979).
Suicide was considered an illegal, intentional act and the sole "proximate cause" of death;
therefore, other entities were not responsible for the suicide. See McLaughlin v. Sullivan,
461 A.2d 123, 124 (N.H. 1983). In the twentieth century, however, laws and the public
perception regarding suicide changed as medical studies revealed that suicide was more
often the manifestation of a mental illness than a deliberate, criminal act. See Kate E.
Bloch, The Role of Law in Suicide Prevention: Beyond Civil Commitment-A Bystander
Duty to Report Suicide Threats, 39 STAN. L. REV. 929, 933 (1987).
100. See McLaughlin, 461 A.2d at 124.
101. See Lake & Tribbensee, supra note 62, at 130.
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individual who caused the injury may be held liable."a 2 Additionally,
liability may result for an individual or entity that provides the
defendant with illegal substances or proscribes legal substances in a
negligent way. For example, in Wallace v. Broyles,1°3 the athletics
director and other school employees at the University of Arkansas
were sued for causing a football player's suicide. 1" The parents
alleged that the school provided their child with a strong pain killer
called Darvocet, a drug which can have mind-altering, addictive, and
depressant effects, without a proper prescription or warnings of the
side effects." At the time that he shot and killed himself, the student
athlete was "undergoing extensive physical therapy treatments" and
taking the drug to cope with the pain of a severe shoulder injury. 1 6
For purposes of ruling on summary judgment, the court found
sufficient evidence to allow the claim to proceed, indicating that
under unusual circumstances,0 7 a defendant may potentially be held
liable for the suicidal ideations and death of another.
More common, however, are lawsuits alleging not that the
defendant caused the suicide, but rather, that the defendant had a
duty to prevent the suicide." 8 Even though these lawsuits are more
common, courts have still been reluctant to find the requisite special
relationship which would impose such a duty. °9 For example, in Jain
v. State,"' Sanjay Jain poisoned himself with carbon monoxide by
running his moped engine in his closed dorm room."' He did this
after revealing to a roommate precisely how he intended to carry out
his plan.'12 Numerous IHE officials knew of Jain's suicidal behavior
and encouraged him to seek counseling.'13 The Supreme Court of
Iowa concluded that a special relationship did not exist between Jain
and the IHE, and consequently, the IHE had no obligation to prevent
102. See, e.g., McLaughlin, 461 A.2d at 124 (describing the exception as one "where a
tortious act is found to have caused a mental condition in the decedent that proximately
resulted in an uncontrollable impulse to commit suicide, or prevented the decedent from
realizing the nature of his act").
103. 961 S.W.2d 712 (Ark. 1998).
104. See id. at 713.
105. See id. at 713, 717.
106. See id. at 713.
107. See id. at 718-19.
108. See Lake & Tribbensee, supra note 62, at 130.
109. See, e.g., Bogust v. Iverson, 102 N.W.2d 228, 232-33 (Wis. 1960) (finding no
liability because the victim's parent failed to establish special relationship and failed to
show foreseeability of student suicide).
110. 617 N.W.2d 293 (Iowa 2000) (en banc).
111. See id. at 296.
112. See id.
113. See id. at 295-96.
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the suicide."4 It held that, if a duty is to be found, it will most likely
be imposed on "institutions such as jails, hospitals and reform schools,
having actual physical custody of and control over persons.""' 5
Despite such strong language indicating that there would be no
special IHE administrator liability for injuries to its students, two
recent cases have alerted officials to the fact that the tides may be
changing. Whereas a special relationship with a student was once
limited to "a narrow class of persons including mental health
clinicians or those entrusted with the custodial care" of a student,"16
now a non-clinician administrator may be held liable. Such was the
case in Shin v. Massachusetts Institute of Technology,"7 where MIT
student Elizabeth Shin committed suicide just two days after the
campus police and the health center were notified of her threats to do
so and after over a year of MIT's awareness of her psychiatric
problems."' A Massachusetts Superior Court justice denied a motion
for summary judgment and allowed Shin's parents to sue two non-
clinician IHE administrators for $27.7 million for failure to prevent
Shin's harm."9 The court determined that two MIT administrators
had a special relationship with Shin as a result of their dealings with
her, "imposing a duty on [them both] to exercise reasonable care to
protect [her] from harm.' 12° Not only did the court find a special
relationship, but it also determined that the administrators had notice
of Shin's condition and should have reasonably foreseen that she
would harm herself. 121  Although the Shin case ultimately settled
outside of court, 2 2 the decision to allow the adjudication of this type
of lawsuit suggests a broadening scope of liability for IHE
administrators.
In the case of Schieszler v. Ferrum College,123 a 2002 decision by
the United States District Court for the Western District of Virginia,
114. See id. at 300.
115. See McLaughlin v. Sullivan, 461 A.2d 123, 125 (N.H. 1983).
116. Heather Moore, Note, University Liability When Students Commit Suicide:
Expanding the Scope of the Special Relationship, 40 IND. L. REV. 423, 423 (2007); see also
Cohen, supra note 96, at 3087 ("In cases where a defendant has been found liable for
another's suicide, the special relationship has primarily existed in the therapeutic and
custodial contexts of hospitals and prisons.") (footnote omitted).
117. No. 020403, 2005 WL 1869101 (Mass. June 27, 2005).
118. Id. at *-5.
119. Id. at *13-14; see also Robert B. Smith & Dana L. Fleming, Student Suicide and
Colleges' Liability, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., Apr. 20,2007, at B24.
120. Shin, No. 020403, 2005 WL 1869101, at *13.
121. Id.
122. See Smith & Fleming, supra note 119.
123. 236 F. Supp. 2d 602 (W.D. Va. 2002) (mem.).
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the court found that college officials had a special relationship with
full-time student, Michael Frentzel 4  While at Ferrum College,
Frentzel had emotional problems and, as a result of some
"undisclosed disciplinary issues," was forced to unenroll and comply
with certain conditions before returning to school. 5 One condition
was enrollment in anger management counseling."2 6 After complying
with these conditions, Frentzel returned to school. 27  Shortly
thereafter, campus police found him alone in his room and noticed
bruises on his head.2 8 When questioned about the bruises, Frentzel
claimed they were self-inflicted. 129  The Dean of Student Affairs,
aware of this incident, required Frentzel to sign a statement that he
would not hurt himself but the dean took no other action to ensure
Frentzel's well-being.13 Three days later, Frentzel hung himself with
his belt in his dorm room.' The federal district court judge found
that the plaintiff had alleged sufficient facts to prove "a special
relationship existed between Frentzel and [the] defendants giving rise
to a duty to protect Frentzel.' 132 The Schieszler case "highlights what
may be an avenue of expanded duty of care for potential litigants:
knowledge of a past suicide attempt coupled with inadequate
emergency responses that may have discouraged the student from
seeking professional help."' 33
Courts have found that a special relationship (and correlative
duty) exists between IHE and student in non-suicide cases as well.
These decisions usually base their argument upon one or more of the
following factors: societal expectations, 34 university policies that
imply a voluntary assumption of responsibility,135 and the recognition
that the IHE is in a better position to bear the risk than the student.13 6
124. Id. at 609.
125. Id. at 605 (internal quotations omitted).
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 609.
133. See PAVELA, supra note 42, at 5.
134. Mullins v. Pine Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 335 (Mass. 1983) ("Parents, students,
and the general community still have a reasonable expectation, fostered in part by colleges
themselves, that reasonable care will be exercised to protect resident students from
foreseeable harm.").
135. Id. at 336 ("Colleges generally undertake voluntarily to provide their students
with protection from the criminal acts of third parties.").
136. Id. at 335.
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One such case, Mullins v. Pine Manor College,137 involved a young
woman who was abducted from her campus dorm and raped in
another building on campus.1 38 The court in this case found a specific
duty of care to the victim based in part on "existing social values and
customs," '139 a rationale strikingly similar to the abandoned doctrine
of in loco parentis.14 The Pine Manor court identified the
relationship as one that flowed from "the nature of the situation" and
believed the IHE was in the best position to implement safety
measures. 141 Because "[n]o student has the ability to design and
implement a security system, hire and supervise security guards,
provide security at the entrance of dormitories, install proper locks,
and establish a system of announcement for authorized visitors," the
IHE must take on the responsibility itself. 42
Similarly, in Furek v. University of Delaware,143 a student was
injured in a fraternity hazing incident and sued the university for
negligence in failing to control the fraternity and its activities.'" The
university asserted that the student had voluntarily assumed the risk
of injury by engaging in hazing and that no special relationship
existed between the university and its student body.145 Because the
doctrine of in loco parentis no longer describes the relationship
between the university and its students, the two parties now "operate
at arms-length, with the student responsible for dealing with other
students or student groups. "146
The Furek court, while agreeing that the university's duty "is a
limited one," was "not persuaded that none exists.' 1 47  Based on
Restatement § 323, the court reasoned that "if one takes charge and
control of [a] situation, he is regarded as entering into a relation
137. 449 N.E.2d 331 (Mass. 1983).
138. Id. at 334.
139. See id. at 335 (quoting Schofield v. Merrill, 435 N.E.2d 339, 341 (Mass. 1982)).
140. Id.
141. See id.
142. See id. (footnotes omitted); see also Miller v. State, 467 N.E.2d 493, 497 (N.Y.
1984) (holding the college liable for the rape of a student occurring in a dorm room);
Brown v. N.C. Wesleyan Coll., 65 N.C. App. 578, 583, 309 S.E.2d 701, 703 (1983) (noting
that colleges can be liable for criminal assault by a third party upon a student under
certain circumstances).
143. 594 A.2d 506 (Del. 1991).
144. Id. at 510-11.
145. Id. at 511, 517.
146. See id. at 517.
147. See id. at 522 ("The university is not an insurer of the safety of its students nor a
policeman of student morality, nonetheless, it has a duty to regulate and supervise
foreseeable dangerous activities occurring on its property. That duty extends to the
negligent or intentional activities of third persons.").
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which is attenuated with responsibility."' 48 Evidence suggested that
the university not only was knowledgeable of the practice of
fraternity hazing on campus but had repeatedly communicated to
students its policy against hazing, thereby assuming the duty to
protect students from hazing as part of its declared commitment to
provide overall security on campus. 149 The court focused its opinion
on the interconnectedness of the college-student relationship. It
asserted that, despite the recognition of student adulthood, IHEs
continue to regulate and assert control over various aspects of student
life, including the provision of food, housing, security, and various
extracurricular activities. 5' The court concluded that although this
attempt at control is "directed toward a group whose members are
adults in the contemplation of law and thus free agents in many
aspects of their lives ... universities continue ... to regulate student
life" and must therefore be held liable in situations such as these. 1 '
Just as the Furek court emphasized the fact that the university
had taken control of a situation on campus as reason to imply a
voluntary assumption of responsibility on the university, so too might
a Virginia Tech victim's family member argue that the university had
attempted, unsuccessfully, to take charge of Cho's situation before
the shooting. Specifically, through the course of his college career,
Cho became known by fellow students and teachers at Virginia Tech
for his "hostile, even violent writings along with threatening
behavior."' 52 In fact, some Virginia Tech students were so troubled
by Cho's behavior that they stopped coming to class, and one of his
English professors even insisted that Cho be transferred out of her
148. Id. at 520 (citing W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF TORTS 56 (2nd ed. 1972)); see also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 323 (1965) ("One who undertakes gratuitously or
for consideration, to render services to another which he should recognize as necessary for
the protection of the other's person or things, is subject to liability to the other for physical
harm resulting from his failure to exercise reasonable care to perform his undertaking, if
(a) his failure to exercise such care increases the risk of such harm, or (b) the harm is
suffered because of the other's reliance upon the undertaking.").
149. See Furek, 594 A.2d at 520.
150. See id. at 516.
151. Id.
152. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 41. For example, in an assignment
for his upper level poetry class, Cho wrote about his classmates:
You low-life barbarians make me sick to the stomach that I wanna barf over my
new shoes. If you despicable human beings who are all disgraces to [the] human
race keep this up, before you know it you will turn into cannibals-eating little
babies, your friends[]. I hope y'all burn in hell for mass murdering and eating all
those little animals.
Id. at 42.
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class or she would resign. 53  Several other English professors also
expressed their concerns to the head of the English Department.
5 4
The faculty's concerns about Cho were ultimately brought before the
university's Care Team, "comprised of the dean of Student Affairs,
the director of Residence Life, the head of Judicial Affairs, Student
Health, and legal counsel."' 55 Yet, the Care Team was not informed
when Cho's roommates and suitemates reported aberrant behavior to
residence staff at different periods of his stay on campus. Nor was the
Care Team alerted when three female residents reported unwanted
attentions from Cho to the Virginia Tech Police Department
("VTPD") in the fall of 2005.156
In addition to being on notice of Cho's aberrant behavior, the
university took actions that may imply a voluntary assumption of
responsibility. Specifically, when one of Cho's professors contacted
the head of the English Department, Dr. Roy, requesting that Cho be
transferred from her class, the professor was "offered security, but
declined saying she did not want him back in class, period."'57 Dr.
Roy contacted the Dean of Student Affairs about Cho's condition,
and the Dean had one of Cho's poem's evaluated by a counselor. 5 '
Ultimately, Dr. Roy ended up tutoring Cho one-on-one, though it
appears he never stopped being "worried" about Cho; Dr. Roy
continually encouraged Cho to seek counseling.'59 Virginia Tech took
153. See id. at 42-43. One of Cho's professors, Dr. Giovanni, noticed that class
attendance was down, and when she asked another student what was going on, he
answered, "It's the boy.., everyone's afraid of him." See id. at 43.
154. See Alex Johnson, College Gunman Disturbed Teachers, Classmates: President
Comforts Virginia Tech After Student Kills 32 and Himself, MSNBC NEWS, Apr. 17, 2007,
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/18148802.
155. VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 43.
156. See id. at 43-45 ("There were no referrals to the Care Team ... when Residence
Life, and later, VTPD became aware of Cho's unwanted communications to female
students and threatening behavior.").
157. Id. at 43.
158. Id. (stating that the Dean followed up by sending an e-mail message to the Head
of the English Department stating "I talked with a counselor ... and shared the content of
the 'poem' ... and she did not pick up on a specific threat. She suggested a referral to
Cook during your meeting. I also spoke with Frances Keene, Judicial Affairs director and
she agrees with your plan.") (internal quotations omitted).
159. Id. Dr. Roy wrote to Associate Dean Mary Ann Lewis, Liberal Arts & Human
Sciences, about his encounters with Cho:
He is now meeting regularly with me.... This has gone reasonably well, though
all of his submissions so far have been about shooting or harming people because
he's angered by their authority or by their behavior. We're hoping he'll be able to
write inside a different kind of narrative in the future, and we're encouraging him
to do so ... I have to admit that I'm still very worried about this student. He still
insists on wearing highly reflective sunglasses and some responses take several
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various actions that, under the Furek court's reasoning, could be
perceived as a voluntary assumption of risk and responsibility for
Cho, especially considering the security it offered to Cho's English
professor and the special accommodations the English Department
made for Cho to remain enrolled in classes. In light of these facts, the
extent of Virginia Tech's exposure to liability under the "special
relationship" liability theory is unclear but probably greater than
under any of the previously discussed theories.
In summary, unusual circumstances which establish a special
relationship between an IHE and its students are required in order to
establish that the IHE has an affirmative duty to protect its students
from the criminal or wrongful acts of third parties. Although courts
traditionally have been reluctant to impose liability on IHEs for any
harm to their students, the current law is unclear and in flux. Suicide
liability litigation against colleges continues to grow, and the
Schieszler and Shin decisions suggest that, based on the particular
facts alleged in those cases, a new avenue for an expanded duty of
care is developing.16° But, IHEs do not face heightened risk of
liability in general; rather, they face the specific possibility that
"ignor[ing] or mishand[ling] known suicide threats or attempts" will
lead to liability. 6 Moreover, courts have demonstrated increased
willingness to find a duty-imposing "special relationship" in non-
suicide cases, such as in the Pine Manor dormitory rape case and the
Furek fraternity-hazing case. Specifically, courts are more willing to
find that a special relationship exists between the IHE and student
when societal expectations promote such a relationship, when
university policies imply a voluntary assumption of responsibility, or
when the IHE is clearly in a better position to bear the risk than the
student. 16 2
B. Foreseeability & Causation
The foregoing analysis discussed the various theories courts use
to find that an IHE owed a duty to prevent harm to the plaintiff-the
minutes to elicit. (I'm learning patience!) But I am also impressed by his writing
skills, and by what he knows about poetry when he opens up a little. I know he is
very angry, however, and I am encouraging him to see a counselor-something
he's resisted so far. Please let me and Fred know if you see a problem with this
approach.
Id. at 45.
160. See Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll., 236 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609 (D. Va. 2002); Shin v.
Mass. Inst. of Tech., No. 020403, 2005 WL 1869101, at *13 (Mass. June 27, 2005).
161. See PAVELA, supra note 42, at 8.
162. See supra notes 123-42 and accompanying text.
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first prong of the liability test. The second and third prongs of the
test-that the IHE breached its duty and that the plaintiff was
injured-are not as difficult to establish. However, the fourth prong,
which is the focus of this section, requires the plaintiff to prove that,
had the university not acted or failed to act as it did, the plaintiff
would not have been injured. This causation element is often the
most difficult to demonstrate. Courts have noted that "even where a
duty is established, the likelihood of imposing liability on a college for
a student's death is remote because causation is a difficult hurdle to
overcome." 163  Nevertheless, the Shin and Schieszler opinions
demonstrate that, for suicide cases, the likelihood is not so remote as
to be impossible. Nor is institutional liability unheard of for non-
suicide, criminal conduct on campus."
When analyzing the causation element of a student's claim
against an IHE for failing to prevent harm, a court looks to the
reasonable foreseeability of the risk of injury."' If the specific risk is
not foreseeable, it would be wholly unjust for the institution to be
held liable for not taking steps to prevent it. Of course, deliberate
ignorance is not acceptable either; schools cannot turn a blind eye to
dangerous risks on their campuses. Nor should they be held
accountable for general risks. Rather, the risk, and the corresponding
foreseeability, must be specific.
The court's opinion in Schieszler outlines the typical analysis. 66
It recognized the existence of a "special relationship" between the
163. See Cohen, supra note 96, at 3095 (citing Mahoney v. Allegheny Coll., No. AD
892-2003, slip op. at 25 (Pa. Ct. Com. P1. Dec. 22, 2005) ("In our view, the likelihood of a
liability determination (even where a duty is established) is remote, when the issue of
proximate causation... is considered.")).
164. See, e.g., Jesik v. Maricopa County Cmty. Coll. Dist., 611 P.2d 547, 548 (Ariz.
1980) (holding the college liable for the murder of a student killed while registering for
classes). The Supreme Court of Arizona pointed to the fact that the student had identified
his assailant to a security guard and had requested, but was refused, protection. Id. The
institution, via the security guard, thus had specific notice of both the actor and the
specific type of harm likely to occur. Id.
165. See MICHAEL C. SMITH, COPING WITH CRIME ON CAMPUS 86 (1988) (stating that
the foreseeability doctrine has become "firmly implanted in American college and
university law"); see also Michael C. Griffaton, Forewarned is Forearmed: The Crime
Awareness and Campus Security Act of 1990 and the Future of Institutional Liability for
Student Victimization, 43 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 525, 540 (1993) ("Foreseeability, one way
to demonstrate the existence and breach of a duty, is the criterion against which colleges
and universities are judged in determining whether they should be held liable when their
students fall victim to campus crime."); Smith & Fleming, supra note 119 ("The courts'
willingness to find colleges liable for damages hinges on the apparent 'foreseeability' of
the suicide. Courts ask, 'Was the institution somehow put on notice that this was going to
happen?' ").
166. See supra text accompanying notes 123-42.
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university and student but cautioned that the existence of a special
relationship would not, "standing alone, give rise to a duty; the harm
must be foreseeable." '167 The court refused to dismiss the plaintiff's
action, holding that Frentzel's suicide was arguably foreseeable
because there was an "imminent probability" of harm, and the IHE
had "notice of this specific harm."'68 It appears that the same facts
which compelled the judge to find a special relationship in this
situation also established a strong case that the harm was
foreseeable.'69  This holding suggests there will be a stronger
indication that the relationship has created a duty if the student
continuously communicated suicidal contemplations to IHE officials,
thereby giving the IHE knowledge of imminent danger and notice of
the student's intentions. 7 ° Robert Smith and Dana Fleming, higher
education lawyers in the Boston area, point out that the foreseeability
analysis puts IHEs in a "double bind":
On the one hand, if [IHEs] adopt risk-management measures to
avoid dealing with potentially suicidal students, that attitude
will discourage students from revealing their depression and
seeking help, making them more likely to commit suicide. On
the other hand, if an institution reaches out to help a troubled
student, the more contact the student has with campus
counseling services, the more antidepressants the college's
psychiatrist prescribes, and the closer watch administrators
keep, the more likely the institution is to be held liable if that
student takes his or her life.'7'
As Smith and Fleming point out, IHEs are in a difficult position.
First, they struggle to identify which facts in a case might lead a court
167. See Schieszler v. Ferrum Coll., 236 F. Supp. 2d 602, 609 (D. Va. 2002) (pointing
out that in Wright v. Webb, the court held that the duty to protect or assist does not arise
without "an imminent probability of harm," and that the defendant must have notice of a
"specific," not general, danger) (citing Wright v. Webb, 362 S.E.2d 919, 922 (Va. 1987)).
168. See Schieszler, 236 F. Supp. 2d at 609.
169. See id. (citing as persuasive the facts that Frentzel was a full-time student living
on-campus, that he had been required to seek anger management counseling, that
administrators knew of a message he had sent to his girlfriend communicating suicidal
ideations, and that he had sent other similar communications to his girlfriend and another
friend before).
170. The Schieszler court also considered whether defendants could have reasonably
foreseen that they would be expected to take affirmative action to protect and assist
Frentzel. See id. at 609-10. The court noted that, even though colleges are not insurers of
student safety, "parents, students, and the general community still have a reasonable
expectation, fostered in part by colleges themselves, that reasonable care will be exercised
to protect resident students from foreseeable harm." Id. at 610 (citing Mullins v. Pine
Manor Coll., 449 N.E.2d 331, 336 (Mass. 1983)).
171. Smith & Fleming, supra note 119.
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to hold that the university has a special relationship with its student
and a consequent duty to prevent foreseeable harm.172  Second,
assuming that a duty to prevent a foreseeable harm is found, IHEs
are uncertain what is expected of them in order to fulfill that duty. 173
IHEs may escape liability if courts conclude that the institution
satisfied its duty by taking appropriate measures to reduce the risk of
harm. 174 Appropriate measures might include implementing sufficient
security procedures, providing students with campus crime statistics
as required under the Campus Security Act,'175 and increasing the
amount of resources devoted to mental health care and support on
campus. 7 6 But the highly fact-specific nature of each case leaves
IHEs uncertain as they ask themselves at what point they can be
assured that they have taken sufficient reasonable care. An
administrator may assume that, by referring a troubled student to a
mental health professional, she has fulfilled her responsibility and
absolved herself of liability. The Shin and Schieszler cases indicate,
however, that an administrator might be woefully mistaken in making
such an assumption. An IHE needs to know when it can be relatively
certain that it has fulfilled its duty to prevent harm to its students if a
special relationship is determined to exist.
In relation to the Virginia Tech tragedy, the Shin and Schieszler
rulings suggest that even though Dr. Roy, the head of the English
Department who met one-on-one with Cho, continually encouraged
Cho to seek counseling,77 that might not have been enough to shield
the university from liability. In fact, the counseling referral may even
increase the institution's risk of liability because it means Dr. Roy
foresaw the potential harm Cho could do to himself or others. In an
email to the Dean of Student Affairs, Dr. Roy wrote, "I have to admit
that I'm still very worried about this student.... I know he is very
angry.' ' 78  More damning, perhaps, is the information that various
parties at Virginia Tech had about Cho that was never communicated
to the Care Team, the party ultimately responsible for determining
172. Id.
173. Id.
174. For a discussion of affirmative duties-such as the duty to notify and to share
information-that courts may impose on an IHE vis-A-vis a suicidal student and the
measures it may take to fulfill those duties, see Lake & Tribbensee, supra note 62, at 137-
53.
175. See Griffaton, supra note 165, at 536 (citing the Jeanne Clery Disclosure of
Campus Security Policy and Campus Crime Statistics Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1092(f) (2000),
amended by Pub. L. No. 110-315, 122 Stat. 3078 (2008)).
176. See Smith & Fleming, supra note 119.
177. VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 45.
178. Id.
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whether Cho remained enrolled and on campus. For example,
"Residence Life knew through their staff (two resident advisors and
their supervisor) that there were multiple reports and concerns
expressed over Cho's behavior in the dorm, but this was not brought
before the Care Team. '179 Moreover, three female residents
"reported problems with unwanted attention from Cho (instant
messages, text messages, Facebook postings, and erase board
messages)," and one of Cho's suitemates "combined many of these
instances of concern into a report shared with the residence staff."18
Although the residence advisors shared this information with the hall
director and the Residence Life administrator, who in turn
communicated with the assistant director of Judicial Affairs, these
matters were never brought before the Care Team either.'
As the foregoing analysis illustrates, there is a confusing maze of
possible rationales for determining when a college might be required
to pay for a loss suffered by a suicide or related crime on campus.
Unfortunately, the case law does little in the way of providing
coherent analysis or bright-line rules. The Schieszler and Shin cases
increased IHEs' liability while doing nothing to minimize confusion
as to how to avoid it. While many commentators "continue to insist
that in loco parentis is dead in higher education law," '182 thus relieving
colleges of supervisory responsibility for their students, the "duty-
imposing trend" in recent years suggests that colleges still bear the
primary legal burden of student oversight.'83 This is an ironic trend:
in the 1960s, IHEs began relinquishing control over the personal
affairs of students only to have their exposure to liability steadily
increase.'
In sum, Part II demonstrates how an increasing number of legal
doctrines are employed in attempts to lay blame at the door of IHEs
and how the theories supporting a duty of care remain tenuous. In
addition to shaky legal theories attempting to impose a duty of care
on IHEs, federal privacy and disability laws are also muddying the
waters and making it more difficult for IHEs to gain access to the
information they need in order to effectively support and protect
their student populations while limiting their own liability. If IHEs
face potential liability regarding harm caused by mentally-ill students,
179. Id. at 52.
180. Id. at 53.
181. Id.
182. See Lake, supra note 16, at 532-33.
183. See Johnson, supra note 56, at 1075.
184. See id.
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they should be provided the tools to effectively shield themselves
from that liability. The next section identifies three areas where
current federal laws and campus policies should be revised to help
IHEs take the appropriate steps to both protect students and shield
themselves from liability.
III. LAW AND POLICY PROPOSALS
A. Federal Privacy Law and the "Health & Emergency Exception"
The information privacy laws governing the records of college
students are designed to strike a balance between protecting adult
student privacy on the one hand, and allowing information sharing
that is necessary to ensure the health and safety of the student
population on the other.185 This is a very difficult balance to strike,
and the Virginia Tech tragedy illustrated a common misperception
held by IHE faculty and administrators, namely, that the scales
heavily tip toward the interest of privacy over safety. In reality, the
scales are meant to be more equally balanced between privacy and
safety interests. 186
Federal and state privacy laws protect the privacy of student
records and health records. 18 7  Specifically, the Family Educational
Rights and Privacy Act of 1974 ("FERPA") 8 and its regulations1 89
govern the privacy of student educational records, which are broadly
185. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 63 ("Information privacy laws are
intended to strike a balance between protecting privacy and allowing information sharing
that is necessary or desirable. Because of this difficult balance, the laws are often complex
and hard to understand."). See generally Balancing Student Privacy and School Safety: A
Guide to the Family Educational Rights and Privacy Act for Elementary and Secondary
Schools, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (Oct. 2007), http://www.ed.gov/policy/gen/guid/fpco/
brochures/elsec.pdf (explaining a number of FERPA regulations and their application).
186. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 63.
187. In addition, the legal and ethical obligations of confidentiality that characterize
certain professional relationships, such as between a patient and a counselor, psychologist,
psychiatrist, or physician, frequently preclude disclosure of information to any outside
party, including the parent, unless authorized by the patient. "Professional rules of ethics
place extreme importance on the confidentiality between the therapist or physician and
the individual client or patient." Lake & Tribbensee, supra note 62, at 115; see, e.g., AM.
COUNSELING ASSN., ACA CODE OF ETHICS & STANDS. OF PRAC. (2005), available at
http://www.counseling.org/Resources/CodeOfEthicsrrP/Home/CT2.aspx; AM. MED.
ASSN., AMA CODE MED. ETHICS 5.05 (2000), available at http://www.ama-assn.org/ama/
pub/category/2498.html.
188. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (2000) (formerly the "Buckley Amendment"); see 5 JAMES A.
RAPP, EDUCATION LAW § 13.04(2)(a) (2008).
189. See 34 C.F.R. § 99 (2007).
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defined, with certain exceptions,19 ° to include "those records, files,
documents, and other materials which contain information directly
related to a student and are maintained by an educational agency or
institution or by a person acting for such agency or institution." '191
FERPA applies to all public and private educational institutions that
receive federal funding,192 which translates to nearly all postsecondary
institutions.193 FERPA threatens to withhold federal funds from any
educational institutions that "have a policy or practice" of violating its
provisions."'
Before students turn eighteen years old, information from their
educational records cannot be shared unless authorized by law or
with the consent of a parent. 95 FERPA also grants parents the right
to request an amendment to their child's records if they believe them
to be inaccurate or misleading. 96 When a student turns eighteen
190. Some exceptions are records within the sole possession of the maker thereof not
revealed to another person, records of law enforcement units of educational agencies,
employment records of educational institution personnel who are not students, and
records kept by an educational institution's physician, psychiatrist, or other treating
personnel of the school. 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(a)(4)(B).
191. § 1232g(a)(4)(A); see also 34 C.F.R. § 99.3(a)(13)-(14) (defining "education
records"). Student disciplinary records are also protected as education records under
FERPA, but certain circumstances allow disclosure of such records without the student's
consent. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(h). For example, a postsecondary institution may disclose
to an alleged victim of any crime of violence or non-forcible sex offense the results of
disciplinary proceedings carried out by the institution, regardless of the outcome of the
proceedings. Moreover, the institution may disclose to anyone the final results of the
disciplinary proceeding wherein the student was an alleged perpetrator of a crime of
violence or a non-forcible sex offense and found to have committed a violation of the
institution's rules or policies. See § 1232g(b)(6)(B).
192. See § 1232g(a)(3). FERPA defines "educational agency or institution" as "any
public or private agency or institution which is the recipient of funds under any applicable
program." Id.
193. Because the vast majority of higher education institutions receive federal funding,
nearly all higher education institutions are subject to FERPA's requirements. See RAPP,
supra note 188, § 13.04(2)(b) (detailing the applicability of FERPA).
194. See § 1232g(a)-(b). Courts interpreting FERPA provisions generally have found
that individual instances of violations do not rise to the level of "policy or practice"
necessary to have a violation of the Act. See, e.g., Weixel v. Bd. of Educ., 287 F.3d 138,
151 (2d Cir. 2002) (holding that contacting a student's doctor, home instructor, and lawyer
to provide inaccurate information about the student does not constitute a systemic policy
of violating FERPA); Daniel S. v. Bd. of Educ., 152 F. Supp. 2d 949, 954 (N.D. Ill. 2001)
(holding that "individual incidents involving one teacher" are not the equivalent of a
"policy or practice" of violating FERPA); Achman v. Chisago Lakes Indep. Sch. Dist., 45
F. Supp. 2d 664, 674 (D. Minn. 1999) (stating that "a solitary violation is insufficient to
support a finding that the District has violated FERPA as a matter of policy or practice").
195. See § 1232g(b)(1).
196. See § 1232g(a)(2) (stating that funds will not be made available to an educational
institution that does not provide an opportunity for the student or parent to challenge the
content of his educational records).
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years old, or enrolls in a postsecondary institution at any age, all
rights afforded to the parent under FERPA transfer to the student,97
and educational records cannot be shared with the student's parent
without the student's consent. 98
Notwithstanding the consent requirement, FERPA provides four
primary exceptions that authorize, but do not require, a university to
release information in a college student's record. First, FERPA
authorizes disclosure of information in a student's educational record
to other school officials so long as the official is determined to have a
legitimate educational interest in receiving the information. 199
Unfortunately, there has been little to no guidance from the courts or
from FERPA regulations to define what constitutes a "legitimate
educational interest" and who qualifies as a "university official."2 '
Second, FERPA authorizes disclosure to parents when the student
has violated alcohol or drug laws and is under the age of twenty-
one.2"1 School authorities may also disclose a student's educational
records to a parent who claims an adult student as a dependent for
tax purposes.0 2 Third, a school official may generally share personal
observations, impressions, or knowledge of the student with the
parent2 3 because education records do not include written records
"that are kept in the sole possession of the maker, are used only as a
personal memory aid, and are not accessible or revealed to any other
person."2°4  Finally, schools may disclose a student's educational
records to school officials or parents in the event of a health or safety
emergency.2 5
Many parents and even administrators are unclear as to the
exceptions listed above and are unaware of the vast amount of
197. See § 1232g(d); see also Parents' Guide to FERPA: Rights Regarding Children's
Education Records, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (Oct. 2007), http://www.ed.gov/print/policy/
gen/guid/fpco/brochures/parents.html [hereinafter Parents' Guide to FERPA] (providing
parents with information about FERPA).
198. See § 1232g(d).
199. See § 1232g(b)(1)(A); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(1) (2007).
200. See § 99.31(a)(1) (establishing that an IHE "may disclose personally identifiable
information from an education record of a student without the consent" if the disclosure is
"to other school officials, including teachers ... [who] have legitimate educational
interests"). The terms "school official" and "legitimate educational interest" are not
defined in this section of the C.F.R.
201. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(i).
202. See § 1232g(b)(1)(H); 34 C.F.R. § 99.31(a)(8).
203. See Parents' Guide to FERPA, supra note 197.
204. 34 C.F.R. § 99.3.
205. See 20 U.S.C. § 1232g(b)(1)(I) (authorizing disclosure to "appropriate persons if
knowledge of such information is necessary to protect the health or safety of the student
or other persons").
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information that falls outside FERPA and may be freely shared.20 6
Such were the findings published in the commissioned reports
detailing the events of and legal issues surrounding the Virginia Tech
tragedy.20 7 For example, as mentioned above, FERPA does not
preclude the sharing of personal knowledge or observations such as
information gained from a conversation with a student.2 18  Hence,
teachers or administrators who witness a student acting strangely or
inappropriately are not prohibited from sharing that observation with
others. Nor are teachers' informal notes, kept in their sole
possession, considered educational records under FERPA; those
notes may be used as a reference when sharing observations.2 9
In addition to personal observations, records created and
maintained by university campus law enforcement fall outside
FERPA.2 1° In Cho's case, the VTPD received complaints from
female students in the fall of 2005 about Cho's behavior, including
threatening instant messages, emails, and phone calls.2 ' The VTPD
created a record for investigative purposes. After campus police told
Cho to stop contacting one of the females, Cho told one of his
roommates "I might as well kill myself now. 212  This comment
triggered a psychiatric evaluation and overnight stay at Carilion St.
Albans Behavioral Health Center.213 FERPA rules would not have
precluded the VTPD from sharing its records with Virginia Tech
administrators or Cho's parents to inform them that Cho was under a
temporary detention order and had been transported by the VTPD to
Carilion St. Albans Behavioral Health Center for an overnight stay.
Even though the information could have been shared, however, no
federal law imposes a duty upon the VTPD to inform the parties, nor
does it impose a duty upon administrators to request the information.
In Cho's case, neither the female students' complaints nor the
206. See § 1232g(a)(4)(B).
207. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 63.
208. "Nothing in FERPA prohibits a school official from sharing with parents
information that is based on that official's personal knowledge or observation and that is
not based on information contained in an education record." Disclosure of Information
from Education Records to Parents of Postsecondary Students, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC., June
7, 2007, http://www.ed.gov/print/policy/genlguid/fpco/hottopics/ht-parents-postsec
students.html.
209. See supra note 191 and accompanying text.
210. See § 1232g(a)(4)(B)(ii). If campus law enforcement shares the record with the
school, that school copy becomes subject to FERPA rules. However, the copy retained by
the law enforcement agency would not be subject to FERPA rules. See id.
211. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 22-23.
212. See id. at 23.
213. Id. at 47. Unfortunately, this stay was not effective because a professional
evaluated Cho and determined he was not an immediate threat to himself or society. Id.
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overnight detention were reported by the VTPD to Virginia Tech
administrators or Cho's parents.214
In light of the information that may be shared under the FERPA
exceptions, and in response to the finding that many parents and
school administrators are unclear about the scope of these exceptions,
an essential predicate for avoiding another attack like Virginia Tech
will be a robust system which allows for comprehensive, efficient
communication of information between professors, administrators,
residence staff, law enforcement, parents, and any other related
parties. This is not an area where the law needs to be changed. It is
simply up to the university to dedicate the time and resources to
determine what communications system will be most effective for its
campus community. Certainly no one communications system will fit
all campuses-they must be tailored to the specific needs of each
community but must include, at a minimum, an effective gatekeeper.
Another exception to the general rule of nondisclosure of
educational records is that an IHE is not allowed to disclose
information about a student in order to avoid harm to the student or
others. FERPA provides an express exception for disclosures related
to a "health or safety emergency." '215 Nevertheless, what constitutes
an "emergency" is left to the discretion of education officials. This
discretion has been granted to a population of administrators and
staff that suffers from "widespread confusion" as to what degree of
disclosure is permitted under federal and state privacy laws.216 They
find it difficult to discern what circumstances satisfy the requirement
that "knowledge of the information is necessary to protect the health
or safety of the student or other individuals. 21 7  Exacerbating the
214. Id. at 52, 63. In Cho's case, his professors, his suitemates, fellow students, the
Office of Judicial Affairs, the Care Team, and the Cook Counseling Center "all had
dealings with [Cho] that raised questions about his mental stability." Id. Yet, there is no
evidence that Cho's parents, his suitemates, or his suitemates' parents were ever informed
that Cho had been detained by the VTPD, that he had been involuntarily admitted to
Carilion St. Albans Behavioral Health Center for psychiatric evaluation, or that he had
been found to be dangerous himself. Id.
215. See § 1232g(b)(1)(I).
216. "There is widespread confusion about what federal and state privacy laws allow
.... The system failed for lack of resources, incorrect interpretation of privacy laws, and
passivity." VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 2. This confusion and breakdown of
communication were not only present at Virginia Tech in regard to Cho's case-these
problems were discovered nationwide. See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT: ON ISSUES
RAISED BY THE VIRGINIA TECH TRAGEDY 7 (June 13, 2007), http://www.hhs.gov/
vtreport.pdf [hereinafter REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT] (reporting "'information silos'
within educational institutions and among educational staff, mental health providers, and
public safety officials that impede appropriate information sharing").
217. See 34 C.F.R. § 99.36(a) (2007).
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problem is the fact that FERPA regulations state that this emergency
exception is to be "strictly construed,, 218 a requirement that is
unnecessary and only reinforces the misperception that nondisclosure
is the "safest" route, at least in terms of protecting the IHE from
liability. Ultimately, Virginia Tech officials "default[ed] to the
nondisclosure option-even when laws permit[ted] the option to
disclose. 219
The unsettling irony here is that either decision, whether
disclosure or nondisclosure, could expose the institution to potential
liability. A student's psychological disorder alone may not be enough
to constitute a health or safety emergency worthy of disclosure to law
enforcement officials or other administrators on campus. But
nondisclosure of such information, as we have seen, can sometimes
lead to tragic incidents and invite negligence lawsuits against the
institution for failure to prevent a foreseeable harm.22 °
A federal report commissioned by the President of the United
States found "confusion and differing interpretations" as to when
teachers or administrators may share information concerning students
they believe pose a health or safety risk to themselves or others.221
Specifically, campus officials and teachers are uncertain about the
liability they might face if they are later found to have violated
FERPA by sharing protected information.222 In response to the
scrutiny with which federal privacy laws have been examined in the
wake of the Virginia Tech tragedy, the Department of Education has
proposed several new regulations to govern FERPA.23  Foremost
among the proposed changes and. clarifications to the law is an
attempt to grant educational administrators more latitude under the
"health or safety" emergency exception to share information about a
218. See § 99.35(c).
219. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 63. The panel observed that
[s]ometimes this is done out of ignorance of the law, and sometimes intentionally
because it serves the purposes of the individual or organization to hide behind the
privacy law. A narrow interpretation of the law is the least risky course,
notwithstanding the harm that may be done to others if information is not shared.
Id.
220. For example, in order to avoid potential lawsuits, Virginia crafted an eleven
million dollar state settlement agreement with the families of most of the victims in the
Virginia Tech shooting. See Virginia: Settlement in Virginia Tech Shootings, N.Y. TIMES,
June 18, 2008, at A15. Families of twenty-four of the thirty-two victims killed by Cho
participated in the settlement and will receive $100,000 apiece under the settlement. Id.
221. See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 216, at 7.
222. Id.
223. See Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 73 Fed. Reg. 15,574, 15,574 (proposed
Mar. 24, 2008) (to be codified at 34 C.F.R. pt. 99).
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student. 24 Even though legal experts and officials at the Department
of Education have argued in the past that privacy laws are sufficiently
clear and flexible in their application as they currently stand,225 the
Report to the President-identifying a widespread misconception
among IHE officials that "nondisclosure is always a safer choice"-
indicates otherwise.226
The Department of Education's proposed regulations would
provide a "new standard" for when campus officials could release
FERPA-protected information under the "health and emergency"
exception.227 The proposed change requires that "considering the
totality of the circumstances, there must be an articulable and
significant threat to the health or safety of a student or other
individuals, and that the disclosure be to any person whose
knowledge of the information is necessary to protect against the
threat. '221 In addition to clarifying this new legal standard, one that
requires an "articulable and significant threat" to the health and
safety of individuals, the proposed regulations provide a sort of "safe
harbor" to administrators, assuring them that they need only
demonstrate a "rational basis" for their original decision.
[T]he Secretary has determined that greater flexibility and
deference should be afforded to administrators so they can
bring appropriate resources to bear on a circumstance that
threatens the health or safety of individuals. To provide for
appropriate flexibility and deference, the Secretary has
determined that if, based on the information available at the
time of the determination, there is a rational basis for the
determination, the Department will not substitute its judgment
for that of the educational agency or institution in evaluating
the circumstances and making its determination.229
Section 99.36(c) of the proposed regulations has been received
with general approval by many education law practitioners, mental
health experts, and IHE officials. 230  Congress should adopt the
224. See id. at 15589.
225. Doug Lederman, U.S. Proposes New Rules on Student Privacy,
INSIDEHIGHERED.COM, Mar. 24, 2008, http://www.insidehighered.com/news/2008/03/24/
ferpa.
226. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 69.
227. Family Educational Rights and Privacy, 73 Fed. Reg. at 15,589.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. For example, the American Psychological Association ("APA"), along with
dozens of other interested parties, submitted comments to the Education Department on
the proposed FERPA regulations. See APA Submits Comments to the U.S. Department of
Education on Proposed Regulations of the Family Education Rights and Privacy Act, AM.
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"health and emergency" exception as it is defined in section 99.36(c)
of the proposed regulations. Such provisions would insulate any
person or entity from liability (and, in this case, from loss of federal
funding) for making a disclosure in the good faith belief that doing so
could protect a student or others in the community from a health or
safety emergency. Administrators and health professionals should
not be put in the position of having to choose between risking losing
their professional license or job and doing the right thing by the
student. Without a clearer definition of the emergency exception
coupled with a safe harbor provision like the one the Department of
Education is currently proposing, school officials who have observed
first-hand, or received reports of, troubling student behavior are more
likely to opt for nondisclosure.' "Privacy laws that do not allow the
responsible sharing of the mental health data of individuals who pose
dangers to themselves or others" are unacceptable because they
sacrifice the safety of the remaining student population on campus.232
PSYCHOL. ASS'N, May 8, 2008, available at http://www.apa.org/ppo/education/ferpa
0508.html. The APA supported the Department's proposal to do away with "the language
requiring strict construction of the emergency exception" and to institute a provision that
indicated the Department would not substitute its judgment for that of the institution,
because it believes such provisions "will provide greater clarity and flexibility for colleges
and universities when facing an emergency." Id. Several education law practitioners look
favorably on the proposed FERPA regulations as well. For example, one practitioner
applauded the Education Department for making it clear that IHE officials are not likely
" 'to get in trouble for a good faith decision made in the heat of the moment before all
facts are known.'" See Lederman, supra note 225. A lawyer for the Washington firm of
Dow Lohnes believes the new proposed regulations " 'provide[] a significant safety net for
college administrators who have been inappropriately concerned about a narrow
interpretation of emergency conditions' " and will help IHE administrators " 'understand
that at the end of the day, the welfare of the student and the student body and the
community is what is paramount.' " Id. Finally, the President of the University of North
Carolina "commend[ed] the Secretary on the proposed changes," viewing them as "an
enormous improvement over the current language." Letter from Erskine Bowles,
President, Univ. of N.C., to LeRoy S. Rooker, U.S. Dep't of Educ. (Apr. 28, 2008),
available at http://www.regulations.gov (enter "optional Step 2," click first Docket ID,
click ED-2008-OPEPD-0002, select option ending in -0010).
231. The Report to the President, which summarized the findings of meetings with
administrators and mental health practitioners around the country, highlighted a
"consistent theme and broad perception" nationwide, namely that people were concerned
and confused about "the potential liability of teachers, administrators, or institutions that
could arise from sharing information, or from not sharing information, under privacy
laws." See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 216, at 7. The report observed that
"these fears and misunderstandings likely limit the transfer of information in more
significant ways than is required by law." Id. Participants in the study routinely reported
circumstances in which they incorrectly believed that privacy laws precluded them from
sharing certain information. Id.
232. See James G. Hodge, Protecting the Public's Health Following the Virginia Tech
Tragedy: Issues of Law and Policy, 1 DISASTER MED. AND PUB. HEALTH
PREPAREDNESS S43, S45 (2007), available at http://www.dmphp.org/cgi/reprint/l/
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Therefore, as demonstrated by the Department of Education in the
March 24, 2008 proposed regulations, the health and safety
emergency exception must be clearly defined, providing flexibility in
its application and a safe harbor for those who make a good faith
disclosure of information protected under FERPA.
B. Post-Admission, Pre-Enrollment Screening
In addition to dealing with confusing and unclear privacy
information laws, administrators are also hamstringed by the current
federal disability law. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
("Section 504"), as amended, and Title II of the Americans with
Disabilities Act ("ADA") of 1990 both prohibit discrimination on the
basis of disability. Both have similar requirements and, like federal
privacy laws, apply to nearly every college and university in the
United States (i.e., those institutions that receive federal funding).
When a student applies to an institution of postsecondary
education, the institution is not permitted to make what is known as a
"preadmission inquiry" into the student's disability status. 33 That is
because no student may be denied admission simply because he or
she has a disability.234 An institution may, however, require an
applicant to meet essential technical or academic standards for
admission in order to be able to effectively participate in the program
applied for.235 For example, if an essential requirement for a degree
program in physical therapy is physical lifting, an institution may ask:
"With or without reasonable accommodation, can you lift 25
pounds? , 236
Moreover, whereas high schools have an obligation to identify
students within their jurisdiction who have a disability, IHEs are only
responsible for providing services to students who self-identify and
request an academic adjustment.2 37  An academic adjustment, as
defined by the Section 504 regulations, is any modification necessary
to ensure that academic requirements do not have the effect of
Supplement 1/S43?maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&authorl=H
odge&andorexactfulltext=and&searchid=l&FIRSTINDEX=0&sortspec=relevance&reso
urcetype=HWCIT.
233. See 34 C.F.R. § 104.42(b) (2007).
234. See §§ 104.4,104.42.
235. See § 104.44(a).
236. Transition of Students with Disabilities to Postsecondary Education: A Guide for
High School Educators, U.S. DEP'T OF EDUC. (Mar. 2007), http://www.ed.gov/about/
officesllist/ocr/ transitionguide.html [hereinafter Transition of Students with Disabilities].
237. See id.
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discriminating against an applicant or student with a disability.238
Academic adjustments may include "changes in the length of time
permitted for the completion of degree requirements, substitution of
specific courses required for the completion of degree requirements,
and adaptation of the manner in which specific courses are
conducted.,
239
A student's disclosure of a disability to the IHE is always
voluntary. She may choose not to disclose her disability if she
determines she does not require special services. Consequently,
mentally-ill students may easily arrive on campus as a freshman
without anyone in the admissions office, student affairs office, or
counseling center ever knowing that the student has a long-standing
history of mental illness-such was the case with Cho.24°
In response to the Virginia Tech shooting, Virginia Governor
Tim Kaine commissioned an independent panel of experts to conduct
a review of the events leading up to the tragedy, including a detailed
investigation of Cho's mental health history, in order "to make
recommendations regarding improvements to the Commonwealth's
laws, policies, procedures, systems and institutions., 241  Similarly,
President George W. Bush directed the heads of the Departments of
Education, Justice, and Health and Human Services242 to meet with
educators, mental health experts, and state and local officials
nationwide to learn how the federal government can help prevent
such catastrophes in the future.243
It was not long before investigators commissioned by the
Governor and the President discovered that Cho had a long history of
mental instability. From as early as age three, Cho suffered
emotional trauma and was considered "medically frail.",2' Through
238. 34 C.F.R. § 104.44(a).
239. Id.
240. "Cho did not seek any accommodations from Virginia Tech." VIRGINIA TECH
REPORT, supra note 1, at 39.
241. See id. at 5 ("This inquiry should include the response taken by Virginia Tech and
others to note psychological and behavioral issues, Seung Hui Cho's interaction with the
mental health delivery system, including ... communication between the mental health
services system and Virginia Tech.").
242. These included U.S. Secretaries Michael Leavitt (Dep't of Health and Human
Servs.) and Margaret Spellings (Dep't of Educ.) and then U.S. Attorney General Alberto
Gonzales.
243. See REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT, supra note 216, at 1.
244. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 32. Chapter 4 of the report outlines
Cho's mental health history at length. Id.; see also Vicki Smith, Cho's Problems Date to
Early Childhood: Virginia Tech Gunman Began Having Violent Thoughts Early in His
Life, Report Finds, ABC NEWS, Aug. 30, 2007, http://abcnews.go.comlUS/wireStory?id=
3540871.
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the combined efforts of his parents, therapists, doctors, and public
school educators, however, Cho seemed to manage his mental health
problems relatively well until enrolling at Virginia Tech and moving
away from his support network. 45 In middle school, Cho worked
with a therapist doing art therapy because Cho "would not converse
and uttered only a couple words in response to questions." '246 While
in middle school, Cho was diagnosed with severe "social anxiety
disorder," and, in eighth grade, he started showing signs of
depression.247 At one point, Cho began drawing tunnels and caves,
images that concerned his art therapist so much that she asked him
whether he had any suicidal or homicidal thoughts . 4  Although Cho
denied having them, his therapist drew up a contract making him
promise that he would not harm himself or others and that he would
communicate with his parents or someone at school if he did
experience any ideas about violence.2 49  After the murders at
Columbine High School in Colorado, Cho wrote a paper saying he
wanted to repeat the attacks, and his middle school responded by
contacting the family and encouraging a psychiatric evaluation.
Cho was evaluated in June 1999, two months after the Columbine
shooting, and was diagnosed by the psychiatrist with "selective
mutism" and "major depression: single episode., 251  The doctor
prescribed the antidepressant Paraxetine, which Cho took for a year,
after which the doctor stopped the medication because of Cho's
improvement.2
In high school, Cho's "selective mutism" and concerning
behavior resurfaced. One teacher noted that "he was not verbally
interactive at all and was shy and shut down." '253 Despite being on
time for class and diligent with his homework, Cho had practically no
communication with teachers or peers. 4 When guidance counselors
245. See Smith, supra note 244; see also VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 39-
40 ("The [high] school that Cho attended played an important part in reducing the
possibility of severe regression in his functioning. The school worked closely with Cho's
parents and sister. There was coordination between the school and the therapist and the
psychiatrist who were treating Cho. These positive influences ended when Cho graduated
from high school. His multifaceted support system then disappeared leaving a huge
void.").
246. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 34.
247. See id. at 34-35.
248. See id. at 35.
249. See id.
250. See id.
251. See id.
252. See id. ("[H]e seemed to be in a good mood, looked brighter, and smiled more.").
253. Id. at 36.
254. See id.
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asked Cho whether he had ever received mental health or special
education assistance in middle school, he reportedly answered no
(untruthfully).2 5' After a core evaluation administered by Cho's high
school, he was provided with an Individualized Education Plan
("IEP") as mandated by federal law, and provisions were made for
special services and accommodations to meet Cho's needs, notably,
"modification for oral presentations, as needed, and modified grading
scale for oral or group participation. '256  "With this arrangement,
Cho's grades were excellent., 257
When applying to Virginia Tech, Cho was not required to write
an essay (it was optional) or to procure letters of recommendation
from teachers or counselors for his admissions application. 251
Evaluation was based primarily on grades and SAT scores '21 so
"[w]hat the admissions staff at Virginia Tech did not see were the
special accommodations that propped up Cho and his grades,"
including private sessions with teachers that spared him public
speaking.260  Although the university, either through letters of
recommendation, a personal interview, or reports from Cho's
secondary institution, could have been made aware of his pre-existing
conditions, it never was.' In other words, the Virginia Tech
admissions application could have lawfully requested more
information from its applicants, information that, in Cho's case, might
very well have alerted the admissions committee to the fact that
special academic accommodations had been made for Cho.
Nonetheless, as mentioned above, federal disability law prohibited
Virginia Tech from making a "preadmission inquiry" about Cho's
disability status. So, because Cho did not request academic
adjustment or accommodation, the university had no way of
identifying him as a student with a documented disability.262
These facts paint an astonishing picture. Cho's mental illness
was long-standing and well-documented before arriving at Virginia
Tech. His multifaceted support networks in middle and high school,
networks that had seemingly succeeded in keeping Cho on a
constructive path,-were not only kept hidden from university officials,
they virtually dissolved upon his arrival on campus. This left a huge
255. See id.
256. See id.
257. Id. at 37.
258. See id.
259. Id. at 38.
260. See id.
261. See id.
262. See Transition of Students with Disabilities, supra note 236.
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void in Cho's life as well as in his college record. Virginia Tech had
no knowledge of Cho's mental health history-all record of his past
practically disappeared.
Whereas some might argue that students should be afforded a
fresh start in college, surely, in hindsight, one can understand how
information like the kind that Cho's middle and high schools had is
"critical to public safety and should not stay behind as a person moves
from school to school." '263 Students and schools should be required to
submit records of a student's emotional or mental disturbance after
the student has been admitted to the IHE but before enrolling in the
institution. This would avoid the type of discrimination that the
ADA is designed to prevent while still putting universities on notice
as to those students who have special needs. Such disclosure would
afford the student and IHE officials the time to meet and discuss a
counseling and academic plan, much like the IEP required by federal
law in primary and secondary education. Such a plan might, at a
minimum, assign a mentor to that student-someone who would
make it a priority to follow the mental, emotional, and academic well-
being of that student and ensure he does not "fall through the
cracks."
This information should not be used to single the student out or
restrict him from regular college activities. Rather, it should be used
to provide him with more meaningful counseling and support. This
proposal recognizes the reality that individuals suffering from mental
illness are frequently the least qualified to evaluate their own
situation and determine whether they need to ask for "academic
adjustment" or some other university service. For example, Cho's
high school guidance counselor and others who knew his situation
urged him to choose a small college close to home, but he was
determined to attend Virginia Tech.2" Though offered the name of a
person to call if he had trouble adjusting, Cho never called.265
This proposal also recognizes that traditional, college-aged
students arrive on campus in a " 'middle' stage of development,
somewhere between adolescence and full adulthood" and need more
development opportunities and support than many colleges are
currently providing.266 Prominent author and psychiatrist Willard
Gaylin voiced this perspective:
263. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 39.
264. See id. at 37.
265. See id. at 38.
266. See GARY PAVELA, THE POWER OF ASSOCIATION: DEFINING OUR
RELATIONSHIP WITH STUDENTS IN THE 21ST CENTURY 2 (1995).
[Vol. 87
DISABILITY AND PRIVACY LAWS
Our society is creating dependent children well into their
twenties, if not their thirties. Yet more and more we're treating
them as though they are autonomous adults. We are taking
children and throwing them into a particularly cold and
detached environment at major universities.... There is, I
think, an extraordinary avoidance of the fact that you're dealing
with essentially a not-yet fully-mature population. Universities
need to come to grips with the fact that, in this autonomous
time, paternalism may be unattractive, but necessary.267
Colleges and universities are dealing with young people, most of
whom have just reached the age of majority, but many of whom still
need supervision and even intervention. Many of these traditional-
aged students are arriving on campus with more diagnosed mental
illnesses than ever before, and a growing number of those who have
not been diagnosed with depression or some form of mental illness
are reporting increased suicidal ideations.26 8  Post-admission, pre-
enrollment screening of these students would avoid violating Title II
of the ADA269 because it would not deny education access to anyone
with a mental disability. At the same time, that screening would
identify those students with diagnosed mental illnesses who have
relied upon a variety of different support services and networks to
function and thrive in this society. If IHEs are going to be held
responsible for the safety and the physical and emotional well-being
of their students, they should be given the information they need in
order to "help students learn how to adapt to stress-turning failures
and frailties into the capacity for self-insight, human connection,
creativity, and productive work. '270
C. Mandated On-Campus Counseling Conditioned on Forced
Withdrawal
Along with privacy laws that are unclear and poorly
communicated, and disability laws that allow important health history
to fall through the cracks, the third difficulty facing IHEs is how to
267. Willard Gaylin, Mental Illness and Personal Accountability, 1 SYNTHESIS: L. &
POL'Y IN HIGHER EDUC. 52,53 (1989).
268. See Anne McGrath, Curing Campus Blues, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Nov. 1,
2004, at 63 (explaining that one of the reasons more students have mental illness and/or
suicidal ideations on campus is that students are encountering increased pressures and
stress, such as burdensome student loans and seemingly insurmountable societal
expectations).
269. Title II of the ADA forbids discrimination against the disabled in several contexts,
including higher education; a denial of access to education by the disabled is prohibited.
See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(3), (b) (2000).
270. PAVELA, supra note 42, at 16 (citation omitted).
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develop an effective on-campus policy to support those students with
mental illness-one that simultaneously saves lives, enriches the
students' college experience, and wards off potential litigation for the
institution. Colleges find themselves in a Catch 22 with practically
any policy choice available to them. The American Council on
Education explained the dilemma:
If administrators are required to prevent suicide when they
become aware of a student's problems, some reluctantly will
avoid involvement with at-risk students. And some will feel
they have no choice but to take the most extreme approaches to
at-risk students-trying to have them hospitalized or forcing
them to withdraw from the university or notifying their
parents-even when the mental-health experts determine these
steps are not in the students' best interest.271
One of the primary difficulties in choosing an appropriate campus
program designed to help students with mental illness is discerning
which policies save the most lives but pose the least amount of
privacy concerns.
IHEs tend to go with one of three main approaches. The first is
a voluntary counseling program. This program requires colleges to
wait for students to seek out counseling on their own, either by self-
initiative or by suggestion from friends or faculty. Such a policy
protects colleges from running the risk of violating FERPA privacy
laws, and it also protects colleges from lawsuits alleging a violation of
the ADA, which prohibits discrimination on the basis of disability.272
In the context of mental illness on college campuses, cases alleging a
violation of the ADA are often brought in response to a university
policy that dismisses a student for a threatened or attempted
suicide.273 Despite the fact that a voluntary counseling policy protects
institutions from alleged FERPA and ADA violations, universities
still run the risk of a negligence suit if the student ultimately harms
himself or others. Moreover, this type of program relies on students
to "self-identify" or to follow the suggestion of friends and family but,
271. See ACE Submits Amicus Brief in Support of MIT in Case of Student Death, AM.
COUNCIL OF EDUC., Feb. 27, 2006, http://www.acenet.edu/AMlTemplate.cfm?Section=
Search& template=/CM/HTMLDisplay.cfm&ContentlD=14632.
272. See supra note 269.
273. See Julie Rawe & Kathleen Kingsbury, When Colleges Go on Suicide Watch,
TIME, May 14, 2006, at 62. A successful plaintiff's claim must prove: (1) that he has a
disability; (2) that he was either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of
some public entity's services, programs, or activities; and (3) that such exclusion, denial of
benefits, or discrimination was by reason of plaintiff's disability. See Darian v. Univ. of
Mass., 980 F. Supp. 77, 84 (D. Mass. 1997).
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as we saw in Cho's case, even though his high school counselors
encouraged him to seek counseling, he never sought help.274
Mentally-ill students are not always the best judge of when and how
they need to seek help.
In contrast to voluntary counseling programs are IHE policies
that require students to withdraw from school for threatening or
attempting to commit suicide or other criminal acts. These policies
arguably have a greater chance of saving lives. But when universities
adopt mandatory-leave policies for any student who expresses
suicidal ideations to commit suicide, they create a number of
problems. IHEs not only come across as shockingly insensitive, but
they also run the risk that emotionally distressed students will be less
willing to come forward and get the professional help they need.
Moreover, IHEs risk lawsuits from students who claim under the
ADA that they have been unfairly discriminated against for being
mentally unstable. For example, in October 2004, Jordan Nott
checked himself into a psychiatric ward where, within thirty-six hours,
he received a letter from George Washington University informing
the sophomore that he had been suspended for being a danger to
himself and others and that if he returned to campus, he would be
arrested.275  Nott switched schools and sued the university for
compensatory damages. 276 The college ended up settling with him in
2006.277 Similarly, a female student at Hunter College of the City
University of New York reached a $65,000 settlement agreement with
the school after she sued it under federal antidiscrimination laws for
expelling her from her dorm room when she overdosed on Tylenol. 78
With forced withdrawal, IHEs also risk violating FERPA if they
disclose privileged health and student records to university officials
and parents when the decision is made to send the student home. 79
Granted, a student's recourse under FERPA is very limited. In the
274. See VIRGINIA TECH REPORT, supra note 1, at 38.
275. Counseling Crisis, INSIDEHIGHERED.COM, Mar. 13, 2006, http://www.inside
highered.com/news/2006/03/13/counseling.
276. See id. (reporting that the twenty-one-year-old Notts alleged that, after seeking
help for depression at the campus counseling center, George Washington University
"disciplined him, threatened him with criminal prosecution and ultimately ended his
college career at the school of his choice").
277. See Su, supra note 18; Tamar Lewin, Laws Limit Colleges' Options when a Student
is Mentally Ill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 19, 2007, at Al (reporting that the settlement amount was
to remain confidential).
278. See David B. Caruso, Suicidal Students Challenge Dorm Evictions, CHI. TRIB.,
Sept. 7, 2006, at 4 (reporting the student's eviction from her dorm because, according to
the school, she had violated her housing contract by attempting suicide).
279. See Cohen, supra note 96, at 3102.
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event that a school improperly discloses a student's records, the
student has no private right of action under FERPA28 ° and must wait
for the Department of Education to advance his cause. However, an
IHE still runs the risk of losing federal funding for violating
FERPA 8' Moreover, individuals do have a private right of action
under the ADA through the incorporation of the Rehabilitation Act
of 1973,282 which authorizes private citizens to bring suits for money
damages. 83 The Department of Education in 2005 warned a handful
of schools whose policy of forced withdrawal crossed the line, and the
Department's Office for Civil Rights began informing schools that a
person should be considered a direct threat worthy of dismissal only
when there is "a high probability of substantial harm and not just a
slightly increased, speculative or remote risk. '' 2 4 This means there
needs to be a detailed evaluation of the student as well as an
opportunity for the student to be heard and to make her case.
An alternative to voluntary counseling and forced withdrawal
programs is mandatory evaluation conditioned on forced
withdrawal.285 Under Cohen's proposed program, a mandatory
evaluation program would "require a student who makes a suicide
threat or attempt, to attend a specified number of counseling
sessions. ' '216 If the student refuses, she would be required to withdraw
from the school.287 Though admittedly imperfect, this option gets
closer to striking a healthy balance between privacy (and autonomy)
and safety.
Although Cohen's suggestion is meant to apply to suicidal
students, the idea should be expanded to include all students who
demonstrate disturbing, aberrant, or violent behavior, not just
suicidal ideations. Of course, the difficulty with expanding the policy
to include students demonstrating disturbing or aberrant behavior is
that what constitutes such behavior is highly subjective, and the policy
runs the risk of being both overinclusive and underinclusive.
280. See Gonzaga v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 290 (2002) (holding that Congress allows the
Secretary of Education, and not private citizens, to enforce FERPA's provision).
281. See id. at 278 (noting that Congress directed the Secretary of Education to
withhold federal funds from any public or private educational institution that fails to
comply with FERPA).
282. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2006).
283. See 42 U.S.C. § 12133 (2000).
284. See Rawe & Kingsbury, supra note 273, at 62-63.
285. See generally Cohen, supra note 96, at 3120 (proposing and discussing a
mandatory evaluation program).
286. See id. at 3120.
287. Id.
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Mandatory evaluation conditioned on forced withdrawal can be
overinclusive because what one individual might identify as disturbing
or aberrant might not qualify as such to another individual. One way
to guard against overinclusiveness, Cohen suggests, is the
incorporation of an appeals process.288 That way, if a suicide threat or
disturbing behavior was taken out of context or misconstrued, the
student could make her case and potentially avoid an unnecessary
evaluation. Another check on overinclusiveness is clearly defining
what sort of behavior qualifies a student for the counseling program.
There is much to be learned from colleges that have attempted to
implement such programs and to define behavioral thresholds that
would trigger an assessment. Many schools are trying to emulate the
mandatory assessment program developed at the University of
Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.289 In the 1980s, Paul Joffe, Director of
the Suicide Prevention Program at the university, instituted a
"mandated assessment" program that required students with suicidal
ideations to either attend four sessions of professional assessment or
withdraw from school.2 9° The program strived for structured and
consistent application of its behavioral threshold, that is, the point at
which someone was deemed to have demonstrated suicidal
behavior.2 91 University administrators, faculty, and staff were trained
to identify the actions that required the filing of a suicide incident
report, thereby triggering the mandated assessment program.2 92
Actions included "preparation of means (e.g., purchasing pills),
practicing of means (e.g., holding a knife over one's wrist), public
statements, and attempts."'2 93 Over 1,800 students have completed the
program-none have committed suicide, and only one was forced to
leave.2 94
A program like Joffe's could be established and expanded to
support students who not only express or demonstrate suicidal
tendencies but disturbing and/or aberrant behavior as well. Like the
University of Illinois program, the proposed program would need a
288. See id. at 3125; see also Joffe, supra note 23, at 92. The University of Illinois, for
instance, provided an appeals process which allowed students to challenge the accuracy of
their suicide incident reports and the necessity of an evaluation. Id.
289. See id. at 3123.
290. Id. at 3120.
291. Id. at 3122.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 3122; see also Joffe, supra note 23, at 91 (noting that, for example, the same
report and resulting "mandate applies to a student taking three Tylenol (with the intent of
dying), a student taking 100 Tylenol, or the student who buys 100 Tylenol for the purposes
of killing himself or herself" but did not actually take them).
294. See Rawe & Kingsbury, supra note 273, at 63.
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similar enumeration of actions that would qualify as disturbing or
aberrant, such as violent or bizarre writing and erratic or "antisocial"
behavior. The challenge in establishing such a system will be
separating the wheat from the chaff, that is, the "loners" from those
who actually pose a potentially real threat to themselves or others.295
The IHE can minimize overinclusiveness by relying on mental health
professionals (usually psychologists or psychiatrists) to separate the
students who are truly a threat from those who are not.
Joffe's mandated assessment program discovered that students
usually resisted participation in the program and asserted that they
had the right to decide whether they live or die, without interference
from the university.296 In response, a member of the assessment team
would shift the focus of the conversation to the student's university
attendance, reminding the student that attendance was a privilege,
not an inalienable right, conditioned upon the student meeting certain
standards of conduct.297 These standards of conduct required a
student not only to maintain a certain grade point average but also to
restrain from violence, to respect the rights of others, and to "adhere
to a standard of self-welfare or self-care., 298 The team explained that
a recent suicide threat or attempt was evidence of a breach of that
standard of self-welfare or self-care.299  Perhaps a threatening
comment to a fellow student, a violent writing assignment submitted
to an English professor, or withdrawn or antisocial behavior would be
evidence of a breach of the standard of non-violence and respecting
others' rights. This sort of behavior would simply need to be defined
in the university's student code of conduct.
295. See Brett A. Sokolow, How Not to Respond to Virginia Tech-I,
INSIDEHIGHERED.COM, May 1, 2007, http://www.insidehighered.com/views/2007/05/01/
sokolow.
Many students are loners, isolated, withdrawn, pierced, tattooed, dyed, Wiccan,
skate rats, fantasy gamers or otherwise outside the "mainstream." This variety
enlivens the richness of college campuses, and offers layers of culture that quilt the
fabric of diverse communities. Their preferences and differences cannot and
should not be cause for fearing them or suspecting them. But, when any member
of the community starts a downward spiral along the continuum of violence,
begins to lose contact with reality, goes off their medication regimen, threatens,
disrupts, or otherwise gains our attention with unhealthy or dangerous patterns,
we can't be bystanders any longer. Our willingness to intervene can make all the
difference.
Id.
296. See Joffe, supra note 23, at 92.
297. Id.
298. See id.
299. See id.
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In addition to being overinclusive, the mandatory evaluation
policy is also underinclusive because some individuals demonstrate
outward signs of general well-being and "normalcy" while
experiencing disturbed, depressed, suicidal, or homicidal ideations.
Such was the case with Sanjay Jain, a freshman at the University of
Iowa who attempted suicide in his dorm room.3°° In spite of his deep
depression, Jain's "frequent phone conversations with his parents
were reportedly upbeat. [Jain], in his father's words, described
everything about college as 'awesome.' "1301 Some individuals
suffering from mental illness are able to conceal it well, even from
those who love and know them best. Although Jain's parents were
not alerted to his suicide attempt,30-an issue that is also of concern
but outside the scope of this Comment-what is important to realize
is that the university was made aware of this attempt, and, under a
mandatory assessment program, Jain would have been required to
attend the sessions or else withdraw from school.
Despite the obvious disadvantages of over and
underinclusiveness, mandatory evaluation conditioned on forced
withdrawal is the policy which gets closest to any policy of identifying
at-risk students and protecting the campus community while still
preserving students' privacy rights. The program places a premium
on trying to keep the student enrolled-working with a team of
professionals instead of mandating a medical leave or suspension.
Rather than notify parents of a child's suicidal or aberrant behavior
and run the risk of violating FERPA, the University of Illinois urges
"colleges and universities to adopt their own rigorous internal
standard of administrative response.""3 3 This also becomes a situation
where clarifying and expanding the definition of a FERPA health and
safety emergency would protect a college. Where a college using the
mandatory assessment policy forces the withdrawal of a student
either because it deems the student an extreme risk to himself or
others or because the student fails to comply with the minimum
number of assessment sessions, the FERPA emergency exception
would protect the college. Another benefit to mandatory assessment
conditioned on withdrawal is that a plaintiff would have more
difficulty bringing a negligence claim against the university.
There is really no policy which could ensure that every single
student suffering from undiagnosed mental illness is identified,
300. Jain v. Iowa, 617 N.W. 2d 293,294 (Iowa 2000) (en banc).
301. Id. at 295.
302. Id. at 294-95.
303. See Joffe, supra note 23, at 99.
2008]
NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
assessed, treated and/or expelled. Nor would we want to develop a
policy which instilled a sort of "academic solitary confinement"
whereby students were encouraged to keep to themselves and be
hyper-cautious regarding everyone around them.
[S]uch over-protectionism would utterly destroy our
universities, which expect almost as much education to come
from informal discourse among students as from lectures and
papers. Only by conceding that colleges and universities cannot
protect every student every minute of the day, and that some
kinds of violence are simply unforeseeable, can universities
continue to provide the education they were established to
offer. 3
0 4
Notwithstanding, mandatory evaluation conditioned on forced
withdrawal boasts of consistency, inclusiveness, and privacy
protection-qualities that other alternatives do not provide.
CONCLUSION
In the wake of the Virginia Tech tragedy, lawmakers and
university administrators are struggling to strike a balance between
security, liberty, and privacy for student populations on campus.
With the death of in loco parentis, IHEs have lost much of their
ability to regulate student behavior while yet, ironically, their
exposure to liability has increased. Developments in recent case law
suggest that courts might be more willing than in the past to find a
special relationship between the student and IHE and, with it, a duty
for IHEs to prevent harm to its students. As it stands, universities are
unclear as to when they might be held liable and what sorts of
precautions might fulfill their duty of care. IHEs risk costly litigation
by developing supportive mental-health policies, but they risk
students' lives if they do not develop such policies. Assuming
universities do owe a duty of care to their students and failure to
fulfill that duty will result in monetary damages or the loss of federal
funding, IHEs must be afforded the tools to simultaneously protect
their students from harm and themselves from liability.
This Comment suggests ways that law and policy should be
changed to help IHEs minimize their exposure to liability and more
effectively deal with the complex societal problem of mental illness
and related violence on campus. Currently, federal privacy laws such
as FERPA are complicated and frequently misunderstood. Once the
304. See PHILIP BURLING, CRIME ON CAMPUS: ANALYZING AND MANAGING THE
INCREASING RISK OF INSTITUTIONAL LIABILITY 18 (1991).
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student has enrolled at an IHE and the school is confronted with the
possibility that the student may be at risk for suicide or serious harm
to others, the IHE must artfully balance the desire to include other
parties, such as parents or an entity outside of the institution, with the
student's privacy interests. While designed to place an absolute
premium on the privacy of students and the ethical obligations of
professionals, FERPA does provide exceptions to the general rule of
nondisclosure, particularly the health and safety emergency
exception. Investigatory reports published in the wake of the
Virginia Tech tragedy discovered widespread confusion in regard to
these FERPA exceptions and a general misperception that
nondisclosure is the safest route. In response, the Department of
Education has proposed regulations that would provide a new
standard for the FERPA health and emergency exception and a safe
harbor for those who make a good faith disclosure of FERPA-
protected information. Congress should adopt these proposed
regulations, thereby encouraging the type of information exchange so
regretfully missing in the Virginia Tech tragedy.
Moreover, federal disability law has created a sort of "no man's
land" for students with diagnosed mental illness who, like Cho, are
provided personal, individualized adjustments and academic plans
through high school but are left to voluntarily self-identify once they
go off to college. IHEs are left to fill in the gaps where they can and
provide "reactive" care to the student instead of proactive,
specialized attention like the student was previously accustomed to
receiving. Some might argue that students reaching majority age
should be afforded a "clean slate" and that their rights of privacy and
autonomy preclude such pre-enrollment inquiries. However, while
"[p]rotecting the privacy of people seeking mental health services is
an important societal goal .... [i]ndividual privacy must consistently
be balanced with community needs,""3 5 such as the safety concerns of
other students on campus.
More important than any legal or policy proposal is the attitude
and philosophy with which IHEs approach their students. Gary
Pavela, a noted educational scholar, warns against approaching
student suicide and, for the purposes of this paper, student mental
illness, from a risk-management perspective instead of an educator's
perspective.3 6 "As educators, we have to take some risks. That
means working harder to keep students ... enrolled, working with
305. See Hodge, supra note 232, at S45.
306. Eric Hoover, Giving Them the Help They Need, CHRON. OF HIGHER EDUC., May
19, 2006, at A39) (recording an interview with Gary Pavela).
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them, giving them the help they need, and not finding faster and more
creative ways to remove them."3 7  Moreover, Pavela encourages
IHEs to err on the side of overreaction when students exhibit
troubling behavior-not by sending them home, but rather, by getting
them help.3"8
We, as college administrators, have erred on the side of
underreaction, in terms of notifying parents, in terms of
hospitalization, in terms of therapeutic resources.... What the
cases would point to is that you must react promptly and
appropriately to a student who is manifesting signs of imminent
risk of suicide.30 9
Parents and fellow students must also play a role in reacting
appropriately to troubled students. Parents must educate themselves
about school policies (e.g., whether their child's IHE has a FERPA
waiver) and help direct their children to make wise decisions and to
choose a school whose size, culture, environment, and resources best
match that child's needs. Fellow students must reflect upon what
friendship means-friends do not stay quiet when their friends seem
troubled, and they do not let them handle their problems alone.
It may very well be impossible to ensure that a tragedy like the
one suffered on Virginia Tech's campus will not be repeated, but the
proposals in this Comment attempt to avoid similar tragedies by
affording IHEs the tools they need to focus on student well-being and
continued enrollment while simultaneously limiting their exposure to
liability.
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